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ABSTRACT: 
The decision in Trevor Ivory seems premised on an unexplained deference to the case 
of Salomon and company law generally. However, the concept of a limited liability 
company is only a metaphor. Salomon can be heavily criticised at several levels. It 
should be seen in its historical, social and political context. The law of tort has 
developed significantly since 1897. Salomon is only a case, the same as any other. It 
should not be afforded reverential treatment other than on its intrinsic merits. Those 
merits should be fully examined. 
The decision in Trevor Ivory is wrong and the law should be correspondingly 
reformed. While reform of company law may be inadequate in this area, it would be 
quite appropriate, and indeed essential, to reform the law of tort to restore a better 
balance. Arguably, the law of tort already indicates that Trevor Ivory 1s wrong. 
However, the case of Trevor lvmy is still good law. It should be overruled. 
Limited liability is a privilege, not a right. It should not blind us to the pwposes of the 
law, namely: to cause people to live honestly, not to harm others and to give each 
their due. 
Word Length 
The text of this paper (excluding contents page, footnotes , bibliography and 
a1mexures) comprises approximately 25 ,000 words. 
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THE WISDOM OF SALOMON? 
THE TORT DUTIES OF DIRECTORS OF ONE-PERSON COMPANIES 
The main policies behind Salomon lie in the logic of the original statutory 
scheme of the companies' legislation and a freedom of contract. .. approach. 
This arguably tipped the pendulum too far away from creditor protection and 
exposed involuntary creditors at least [such as claimants in tort] to excessive 
risk. This approach neglected the fundamental principles of the law as stated 
by Justinian in relation to Roman Law over a thousand years ago - Honeste 
vivere, alterum non laedere, suum cuique tribuere - the purposes of the law are 
to cause people to live honestly, not to harm others and to give each their due. 
As a consequence, the strict application of Salomon .. . has led to a system of 
limited liability ... which was never countenanced by the early legislation and 
has facilitated abuses ... 1 
I INTRODUCTION 
It is often said that the doctrine of limited liability has been a major instrument 
in making possible the industrial and commercial developments which have 
occurred throughout the world;2 without limited liability companies, the 
world's railways would not have been built. 3 However, the benefits of the 
doctrine have their costs. Indeed, the merits of the doctrine of limited liability 
have been the subject of passionate disagreement by "otherwise level-headed 
commentators" ever since its general availability in the middle oflast century.4 
The 1992 case of Trevor ivory Ltd v Anderson5 illustrated one of the 
difficulties of the doctrine of limited liability: how should the doctrine interact 
with the law of tort, particularly where a negligent person has acted through a 
one-person company? Should tort law or company law take precedence? 
Should the law seek to right a wrong, or is limited liability unimpeachable in 
1 John H Farrar "Legal Issues Involving Corporate Groups" ( 1998) 16 Company and Securities Law 
Journal 184, 200 (bracketed words added). 
2 Gower Principles of Modern Company Law (5 ed, 1992), 70 . 
3 See below n 18. 
4 Paul Halpern, Michael Treblicock and Stuart Turnbull "An Economic Analysis of Limited Liability in 
Corporation Law" ( 1980) 30 University of Toronto Law Journal 117, 117 ["Halpern"]. 
5 Trevor ivory Ltd v Anderson ( 1992) 2 NZLR 517 (CA) [Trevor Ivory]. 
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this context? Conclusions as to where the line should be drawn or which law 
should take priority often seem to depend on one's starting point. 
In the Trevor Ivory case, Mr and Mrs Anderson sought the advice of Mr Ivory 
regarding couch grass that was growing in their raspberry orchard. Mr Ivory 
indicated that he would like to put his advice "through his company"; Mr and 
Mrs Anderson were ambivalent on this point so long as Mr Ivory did the work. 
Mr Ivory advised the Andersons to use Roundup and one of their employees 
carried out his advice "to the letter". The entire raspberry crop died. 
Obviously, Mr Ivory did not seek to make good the Andersons' loss because a 
case was stated for the High Court. The High Court found the advice to be 
negligent and held Mr Ivory's company liable in contract and tort. Mr Ivory 
was also found to be personally liable in negligence. Mr Ivory appealed. 
The Court of Appeal upheld the finding of the negligence against the company 
but overturned the finding against Mr Ivory personally: Mr Ivory was found 
not to have owed a personal duty to the Andersons to take care. 
Most companies in New Zealand are small and typically carry little in the way 
of capital. Initial incorporation may be effected with as little as $1 and profits 
are customarily fully debited out as salary. Where a small company is in the 
"advice" business, its asset-backing may be particularly low as such 
businesses require almost no capital assets to run: the only real "asset" of an 
advice business is the personal knowledge of the proprietor and any tangible 
assets that are required, such as a telephone or a fax, may even be rented. A 
finding against such a company is therefore of little practical effect as there 
will be no money with which to meet the claim. Consequently, the finding that 
Mr Ivory was not personally liable for what was effectively his negligence 
meant that the destruction of the Andersons' raspberry crop, devastating as it 
was, had to be borne by the Andersons themselves, without compensation. Mr 
Ivory is free to set up another company (or companies), and under the same 
6 
circumstances the only moderator would be his personal integrity.6 The law 
did not require recourse to his personal wealth to make good the consequences 
of his negligence. 
It is a decision many people are uncomfortable with. 7 
The limited liability company as a concept is essentially a legal artifice - a 
"metaphorical use of language which entails certain legal consequences. 8 
Metaphors in law are to be narrowly watched, "for starting as devices to 
liberate thought, they often end by enslaving it".9 This paper considers the 
doctrine of limited liability from a historical and an economic perspective, 
before considering the foundation case of Salomon. '0 The paper questions 
whether the Court of Appeal were correct in giving such primacy to Salomon 
(to the unexplained exclusion of a conventional tort analysis), particularly 
given the shaky foundations of that case, its questionable merit in terms of 
one-person companies and its questionable application to victims of tort. 
The recent House of Lords' decision in Williams' 1 provides an interesting 
comparison with the Ivory case, and may assist in its ultimate overruling. 
From a policy perspective, the Trevor Ivory decision is wrong. The purpose of 
this paper is to consider possible avenues by which something could be done 
6 The standards for disqualification of directors under ss 151 (2), 382, 3 83 and 385 of the Companies 
Act 1993 seem quite high, mostly relating to criminal convictions or undischarged bankruptcy. 
Disqualification of a person may occur on the basis that their company failed (s385), but only if the 
Registrar is satisfied that the manner in which the affairs of the company were managed was wholly or 
partly responsible for the failure of the company (s385(4)(a)). Even if the negligence in the Ivory case 
constituted "management" of the affairs of the company sufficient to cause Mr Ivory to be disqualified, 
(which seems unlikely), any such disqualification lasts for a maximum of five years only. 
7 Todd (ed) The law of Torts in New Zealand (2 ed, Brookers, Wellington 1997), 372 ["Todd"]: " it is 
difficult to regard Ivory as a satisfactory deci sion". See also GHL Fridman " Persona l Tort Liability of 
Company Directors" ( I 992) 5 Canterbury Law Review, 41 ["Fridman"]. 
8 Farrar and Russell Company law and Securities Regulation in New Zealand (Butterworths, 
Wellington , 1985), 47 [" Farrar and Russell"]. 
9 Berkey v Third Avenue Railway, 244 NY 843, 94-95 per Cardozo J. 
10 Salomon v Salomon & Co Ltd [ 1897] AC 22 (HL) [Salomon]. 
11 Williams and Another v Natural life Health Foods limited and Mist/in [ 1998] I WLR 830 (HL) 
[Williams] . 
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about it. Possible avenues might include a reform of company law to remove 
the ability of one-person businesses to obtain the privilege of limited liability. 
This would be more consistent with the historical and economic foundations of 
limited liability and would solve the problem caused by the Ivory case. 
Alternatively, reform might be effected through the law of tort. 
II COMPANY LAW 
Limited liability is commonly thought of today as such an integral part of the 
corporate form that to challenge it is "recklessly revolutionary". 12 However, 
the doctrine is of recent origin, having evolved over only the last 150 years or 
so. What is "limited liability" in this context, and how has our law come to 
grant such a blanket privilege? 
A Limited Liability 
"Limited liability" in this context is the principle tlu·ough which the 
shareholders of an insolvent company do not have to contribute their own 
money to the assets in the liquidation to meet the debts of the company: 13 
The starting point is the liability of the company ... The liability of the 
company for its various debts is unlimited; in an insolvent liquidation, where 
the debts over-top the assets available, all of the assets will be used up in 
satisfying the claims of creditors and not all creditors will be paid in 
full ... The liability of the shareholders is limited, but it is necessary to be 
careful about in what sense it is limited .... they are not liable at all for the 
company's debts ... [They] have a liability to contribute to the assets of the 
company in the event of its assets in the liquidation being insufficient to 
meets the claims of the creditors. It is this liability which is limited. The 
liability is ... limited to the amount ' unpaid ' on the shares ... [plus of course 
the amount already contributed]. 
12 Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman "Toward Unlimited Shareholder Liability for Corporate 
Torts" ( 1991) I 00 Yale LJ 1879, 1923 ["Hansmaan"]. 
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This principle is enshrined in section 97 of the Companies Act 1993: 
... a shareholder is not liable for an obligation of the company by reason only 
of being a shareho lder ... the liability ofa shareholder ofa company is limi ted 
to ... any amount unpaid on a share by the shareholder ... 
In other words, once a person has invested money in a company in exchange 
for shares, the amount of that investment is the total amount that the 
shareholder has at stake. 14 In an unlimited liability situation, all of a person's 
wealth is at stake on acquisition of a share in a company. Should the venture 
for which the company was created prove so unsuccessful that liquidation of 
the company is sought, all of the assets of all of the shareholders could be 
called on to make good any unsatisfied company debts. 15 
B A Common Historical Model oftlze Company 
The doctrine of limited liability has its origins in quite a different time and 
circumstance. 16 
Prior to the 19th century, much trading in Britain was carried on without 
limited liability through various adaptations of the partnership form. 17 The 
members of joint stock companies, for example, had unlimited joint and 
several liability for all corporate obligations. 
The commercial matrix altered in the 19111 century as the industrial revolution 
developed exponentially. There were railways to be built, not only in England 
13 Ben Pettet "Limited Liability - A Principle for the 21 st Century?" [ I 995] Current Legal Problems 
125, I 26 ["Pettet"]. 
14 In the ordinary course of events, that is , barring liability as a director or in any of the other more 
unusual circumstances described in s 97. 
11 Although, if pro rata rather than joint unlimited li ability is chosen, each shareholder would only be 
liable in proportion to his or her number of shares in the company. 
16 David W Leebron "Limited Liability, Tort Victims and Creditors" ( 1991) 9 l Columbia LR 1565, 
1566 ["Leebron"]. 
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but also in America, and the shipping industry was burgeoning. Projects were 
bigger, and entrepreneurs needed to amass capital to undertake them; more 
capital was needed than any average entrepreneur was able to amass in a 
personal capacity. Large numbers of people had to be persuaded to invest in 
order to finance the proposed ventures. 
However, the social context of the time meant that entrepreneurs were having 
difficulty in effecting this persuasion. The successes of the joint stock 
companies had seen such a rapid increase in their popularity that the market 
had become flooded with them. Many wealthy British investors had been 
badly burned in the inevitable "correction", amid much publicity. Passive 
investment had come to be seen as dangerous: 18 
"To be a 'sleeping partner' without limited liability, would be exceedingly 
dangerous", and accordingly persons will only invest in a firm with 
unlimited liability where they can control the riskiness of the firm 's activities 
and also monitor the wealth of their co-adventurers. This combination would 
make it impossible for large aggregations of wealth to be assembled at least 
in the private sector. .. 
However, it was possible to achieve limited liability at a micro level: 19 
At present the law ... is that every ostensible partner who shares the profits of 
a trading concern renders himself liable in the whole of his property to the 
whole of its debts ; but in practice ... all the partners contract with each other, 
and the company contracts with every person it deals with, that all claims 
shall be confined to the subscribed fund of the company. Every person with 
whom it deals entering voluntarily into the contract, the principle of limited 
liability is, by common consent, fully carried out, whatever the law may say 
to the contrary. 
17 Pettet above n 13, 130. 
18 Dan Prentice "Insolvency: Inroads into Corporate Personality in the Insolvency Context" in 
Conference Papers - "A Centencuy Celebration of Salomon" Conference [ 1997] 4 [" Prentice"]. 
19 Economist, I July I 854, cited in Halpern above n 4, l l 7. 
10 
Nevertheless, the industrialisation which was perceived as being important to 
Britain at that time was unlikely to occur without private financial support. 
The potential providers of that financial support, who could clearly see the 
potential personal returns an investment in that industrialisation might bring, 
were in a position of political power:20 
The law is so dangerous and unjust towards a man of substance, by putting 
his whole property at the mercy of other persons beyond his control , if he 
does join a joint stock company, that very few men of respectability can be 
found to occupy so perilous a position . 
In addition, the political pressure for a general limited liability regime 
coincided with a prevailing political ethic of laissez-faire. In such an 
environment, when limited liability was already being contracted for at a 
micro level anyway, it was argued that the law should simply provide 
"maximum freedom of contract and ... minimise the transaction costs incurred 
by parties in achieving mutually desired allocations ofrisk"2 1. 
The pressure proved successful: in 1855, the Limited Liability Act was passed 
granting limited liability to companies generally. 
However, this political achievement was accomplished amid much 
controversy. The Times of London, for example, stated that: 22 
Nothing can be so unjust as for a few persons abounding in wealth to offer a 
portion of their excess for the information of a company, to play with the 
excess - to lend the importance of their whole name and credit to the society, 
and then should the funds prove insufficient to answer all demands, to retire 
into the security of their unhazarded fortune, and leave the bait to be 
devoured by the poor deceived fish. 
20 Pettet above n 13 , 145 . 
2 1 Halpern above n 4, 119. 
22 The Times, London, editorial 25 May 1824, cited in Halpern above n 4, 117. 
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The Law Times described the legislation as a "Rogues Charter"; 23 it had been 
rushed through Parliament, and was later criticised for its "oracular" style, 
"leaving to the courts the interpretation of its mystical utterances".24 
C The Legal Theory of Separate Corporate Personality 
Precisely what the Legislature had meant by the concept of general limited 
liability was tested some 40 years later in the case of Salomon. 25 
1. The facts of Salomon 
Aron Salomon was a boot manufacturer who had been trading as a successful 
sole trader in the East End of London for over 30 years. In 1892 he formed a 
company to which he sold his business. His reasons for incorporating might 
never be known, but might have included pressure from his family to give 
them a share in his business. 26 
Under the Companies Act 1862 (a successor to the Limited Liability Act of 
1855), incorporation, and therefore limited liability, could be obtained by 
"Any seven or more persons associated for any lawful purpose". Mr Salomon 
set up the shareholding of "Salomon & Co Ltd" in order to comply with the 
legislation, taking 20,001 shares himself; his wife, daughter and four sons one 
share each as nominees for Mr Salomon. 
Of course, the company had no money with which to meet the purchase price 
of Mr Salomon's business. Mr Salomon therefore " loaned" it £10,000 in return 
for £10,000 of debentures, or IOU' s, secured on the company's property. 27 
13 Pettet above n 13 , 13 I. 
24 Sir Frederick Pollock ( 1897) 13 Law Quarterly Review 6. 
25 Salomon, above n I 0. 
26 This point is mentioned in Farrar and Russell above n 8, 45 . 
27 The actual purchase price was £39,000, £30,000 of which was to be paid for out of money as it came 
in , which Mr Salomon was to immediately return to the company in exchange for fully paid shares. As 
only 20,00 I shares were issued, it seems the remaining £8 ,999 was never paid to Mr Salomon by the 
12 
The company fell on hard times, and lasted only a year before it failed. It is 
said that there was a great depression in the trade and boot workers on whom 
Mr Salomon depended went on a succession of strikes ("Trade unionism was 
becoming a power in the land"28). In an attempt to get the company back on its 
feet, Mr Salomon mortgaged his debentures for £5,000, which money was 
promptly loaned to the company. The company continued to fail, however, 
and was finally put into liquidation. 
The liquidator sold off the assets of the company, and had sufficient funds to 
take only one of two possible courses of action: 
(a) Either the liquidator could favour the debentures, that is, meet the 
claim of the mortgagee and pay the remaining funds (£1,077) over 
to Mr Salomon himself, as beneficial owner of the debentures (Mr 
Salomon had only mortgaged the £10,000 in debentures to the 
extent of £5,000, meaning that Mr Salomon was still owed at least 
£5,000 under them); or 
(b) The liquidator could use the funds to meet the amounts owed by 
the company to its unsecured trade creditors (£7,734). 
Of course, Mr Salomon's secured debentures took preference over the 
unsecured creditors' claims. In an attempt to satisfy the latter, however, the 
liquidator argued that the debentures were invalid on the grounds of fraud. He 
also argued that the board of the company, if there was one, consisted entirely 
of Mr Salomon, meaning there was never an independent board.29 
company. However, the purchase price was acknowledged as representing the "sanguine expectations 
of a fond owner rather than anything that can be called a businesslike or reasonable estimate of value". 
See Farrar and Russell above n 8, 46. 
28 Lord Cooke Turning Points of the Common Law (Sweet & Maxwell , London , 1997), 7 [Turning 
Points]. 
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At first instance, Vaughan Williams J looked upon the case with a "jaundiced 
eye. He disapproved of the one-[person] company which was ... [then] a new 
practice and thought he detected fraud". 30 However, the evidence established 
no fraud; indeed, all the members of the company had been fully aware of the 
terms on which the company had purchased the business, and had accepted 
those terms.31 
On his Lordship's suggestion, a new argument was added to the counterclaim, 
namely that the company was merely Mr Salomon's agent and nominee. As 
such, Mr Salomon as principal was required to personally indemnify the 
liquidator for the sum of the unsecured debts. In other words, Mr Salomon's 
liability was not held to be limited. Mr Salomon appealed. 
Lindley LJ of the Court of Appeal also considered a one-person company to be 
an abuse of the Companies Act: 32 
The formation of the company, the transfer of the business and the issue of 
the debentures , were a mere scheme to enable Mr Salomon to carry on 
business in the name of the company with limited liability contrary to the 
true intent and meaning of the Companies Act 1862, and to enable him to 
obtain a preference over other creditors by procuring a first charge over the 
company's assets by means of the debentures . 
However, feeling some difficulty in describing the company as Mr Salomon's 
agent, his Lordship instead characterised Mr Salomon as a trustee for the 
company which was his mere shadow. Mr Salomon's liability was again held 
not to be limited. Mr Salomon appealed. 
29 David Goddard, "The Development of the Treatment of Corporate Personality from Salomon to 
Meridian" in Conference Papers - "A Centenary Celebration of Salomon" Conference [ 1997) 5 
["Corporate Personality"] . 
3° Farrar and Russell above n 8, 46 ( footnotes 0111 itted). 
31 "Corporate Personality" above n 29, 5. 
32 "Corporate Personality" above n 29, 6. 
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2. A purposive approach 
Lord Cooke has spoken of the unquestionable company law pedigree of the 
judges in the two lower courts.33 Both lower instance judges recognised that 
the legislature had never contemplated an extension of limited liability to sole 
traders. Statutorily-limited liability had developed to attract investors, in order 
that large, often industrial projects, might be facilitated through the 
amalgamation of capital. The associated companies were generally 
characterised by a separation of ownership and control; that is, the investors 
generally did not carry out the day-to-day business of the company 
themselves. Although there were seven shareholders in Mr Salomon's 
company, it was clear that six of them were shareholders "simply in order to 
enable the seventh himself to carry on business with limited liability".34 In Mr 
Salomon's company, there was no "amalgamation of capital" facilitating the 
undertaking of a large project that would not otherwise be undertaken. There 
was no separation of ownership and control. The legislature should perhaps 
have made its intention more clear, however, those familiar with the company 
law legislation of the time knew that: 35 
... the founders of the company law legislation, in using the word 
"associated" meant such an association as, without the help of the statute, 
would have made the persons members of an ordinmy partnership, with 
unlimited personal liability. 
If a court of 1990s New Zealand were faced with the Salomon situation, it 
might instead have resorted to a "purposive approach" in order to give effect 
to the true intention of the legislature. A brief description of what is meant by 
a "purposive approach" follows. 
33 Turning Points above n 28, 8. 
34 Turning Points above n 28, 7. 
11 Sir Frederick Pollock (1897) 13 LQR 6, cited in Turning Points above n 28, 8 (emphasis added). 
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Section SU) of the Acts Interpretation Act 1924 states that legislation in New 
Zealand today is to be given such a "fair, large and liberal construction and 
interpretation as will best ensure the attainment of the object of the 
Act ... [ according to its] true intent, meaning and spirit". 
This provision predicates an approach to legislation based on the scheme and 
relevant objects of the legislation. It requires: 36 
... a careful reading in its historical context of the whole statute, analysing its 
structure and examining the relationships between the various provisions and 
recogn1s111g any discernible themes and patterns and underlying policy 
considerations. 
Lord Cooke of Thorndon has spoken of the appropriateness of a 
"determination to find out the intention of Parliament".37 His recent extra-
judicial comments on the case of Lee v Lee's Air Farming Ltd, 38 the other 
pillar of New Zealand company law,39 illustrate this. 
In the Lee case, the Privy Council held that a shareholder of a one-person 
company was separate from the company itself, thus enabling the company to 
"employ" him, and the shareholder's wife to receive compensation for his 
work-related death. Arguably, this slight misapplication of the doctrine of 
separate corporate personality (the fact that a shareholder is separate from the 
company arguably says nothing about the status of a director, even when both 
statuses are intertwined in one person) was necessary in order to achieve 
justice in the case. Lord Cooke has stated that, were the question in Lee to 
arise before a court today, it might instead be solved "by a more overt 
16 CIR v Challenge Corporation Lld(l986) 2 NZLR 513,549 per Richardson J (emphasis added). See 
also the leading case of CIR v Aleem NZ Ltd ( 1994) 3 NZLR 439, 442 where Challenge was approved 
and it was stated that the proper approach is to ascertain the true meaning: "The true meaning must be 
consonant with the words used, having regard to their context in the Act as a whole, and to the purpose 
of the legislation to the extent that this is discernible" (emphasis added). 
37 Turning Points above n 28, 9. 
18 Lee v Lee's Air Farming Ltd [ 1961] AC 12 (PC) [Lee]. 
16 
invocation of the policy of the Workers' Compensation Act [ such policy being 
compensation for work-related accidents] ... [as] nothing in the scheme or 
purpose of the Act justified excluding the deceased and his family". 40 The 
principle in the Lee case should be viewed in this light. 
Similarly, if a purposive approach had been adopted in Salomon, it would have 
been easy, and indeed appropriate, for a court to find that Mr Salomon and his 
family were not "associated" in the sense intended by the Act; the company 
that was formed was not such that was intended by the legislature to have the 
privilege of limited liability. In other words, Mr Salomon could have been 
found personally liable for the debts owed to the unsecured creditors on a 
simple interpretation of the legislation without invoking the " legal 
gymnastics" of either agency or trusteeship . 
However, the prevailing interpretative ethic of the late 19th century was what 
might be termed a "black letter form of statutory interpretation". As Mr 
Salomon and his family were "associated" in afamilial sense, the black letter 
of the legislation was arguably complied with. The lower courts were left to 
"agency" and " trusteeship" tools in order to try to give effect to the intention 
of the legislature. 
This is arguably "calamitous" .41 
3. The House of Lords' decision 
The lower court judges arguably reached the right resu lt, but with the wrong 
doctrine. The House of Lords had little difficulty in overturning Lindley LJ's 
" trusteeship" finding, and, with respect, this must be right. To have held that 
19 Cooke P seems to consider Salomon and Lee as the two pillars of company law: Trevor Ivory above 
n 5, 523. 
40 Turning Points above n 28, 11 (emphasis added). 
4 1 To quote Sir Otto Kahn Freund's description of the House of Lords' reaching of the very result the 
lower courts were striving to avoid. See ( 1994) 7 MLR 54, cited in Turning Points above n 28, 8. 
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shareholders by definition are trustees for their compa111es, or indeed that 
companies by definition are agents for their shareholders, would have stymied 
much that is of value of the corporate form. 
Instead, their Lordships simply invoked the prevailing black letter 
interpretative method of the time and held Mr Salomon not personally liable 
for the unsecured contractual creditors of the insolvent company. Possibly in 
response to the argument that the company was an "agent" for Mr Salomon, 
the House of Lords held that this one-person company was instead a "real 
thing", separate from Mr Salomon himself. The creditors were its creditors, 
not Mr Salomon's. The company had to honour its debentures to Mr Salomon, 
and Mr Salomon was not liable for the debts of the company. His liability was 
limited: 42 
Their Lordships ' speeches ... are not profound analyses of the nature of 
corporate personality. They do not delve into the social and legal rationale 
for limited liability, let alone the economics of that institution. They read like 
a simple exercise in statutory interpretation . The company, they point out, 
was formed and registered in accordance with the statute. The statute did not 
say any more than that there must be seven shareholders - and there 
were .... The policy identified by the Court of Appeal prohibiting "one-
[person] companies" was to be found nowhere in the Act. .. Provided the 
statutory formalities were complied with, the company existed. 
Almost as an accident of history, therefore, the case of Salomon permitted the 
incorporation of a one-person business. 
-I. Discussion 
The decision in Salomon was heavily criticised at the time. Higgins in The Law 
of Partnership stated that: 43 
42 "Corporate Personality" above n 29, 6. 
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Seldom has the entire House of Lords sunk to such a level of jurisprudential 
ineptitude as to reject the clear intention of the legislature in favour of the 
application of the so-called literal rule of interpretation. The decision in ... 
[Salomon] has probably done more to undermine commercial integrity in 
sixty years than did the Statute of Frauds in nearly three hundred. 
Other academic commentary argued that: 44 
... no-one who knew anything of the earlier history of the Companies Acts 
could doubt that such a decision as had now been given would have been 
impossible 30 or even 20 years previously. 
Further, the decision was thought to result in the company becoming "a 
means of evading liabilities and concealing the real interests behind the 
business".45 
Salomon is today hailed as authority for the "separate identity" principle, now 
enshrined in section 15 of the Companies Act 1993 .
46 This principle has been 
elevated to almost god-like status; limited liability has been likened to such a 
"birtlu·ight" of corporations that any proposals for its limitation or abolition are 
treated "as if such proposals would undermine the foundation of modern 
industry".47 
However, this is odd given that much is unsatisfactory about the case. The 
black-letter form of statutory interpretation on which it is based has fallen into 
some disrepute in a modern "purposive" era, and it is unlikely that a court of 
1990s New Zealand would reach the same result. The decision runs counter to 
the policy of the relevant companies' legislation of the time. The privilege of 
limited liability was never intended to be afforded to small one-person 
43 Higgins (1963), 16 cited in Halpern above n 4, 119. 
44 Sir Frederick Pollock, ( 1897) 13 LQR 6, cited in Turning Points above n 28, 8. 
4
' Professor Otto Kahn Freund ( 1944) 7 MLR 54, cited in Halpern above n 4, 119. 
46 "A company is a legal entity in its own right separate from its shareholders and continues in 
existence until it is removed from the New Zealand register". 
47 Leebron above n 16, 1569. 
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companies, with no separation of ownership and control, no accumulation of 
capital, and no real offsetting benefit in terms of contribution towards the 
industrialisation of Britain. 
Despite this, the Salomon decision seems to have gained a life of its own, 
independent from and "ectopic"48 to its individual holdings. The decision needs 
to be re-examined from a policy perspective and, as with any case of any 
century, should not be afforded reverential treatment other than on its intrinsic 
merits. 
Three points should be noted on any such re-examination. Firstly, the separate 
identity principle holds that the company is separate from its shareholders. The 
19111 century legislators might have had in mind larger companies, with a 
separation of ownership and control, but nevertheless the principle is silent on 
the status of directors vis-a-vis either shareholders or the company itself. Mr 
Salomon was not held to have transgressed in his capacity as a director, but 
simply that his liability as shareholder was limited. 
Secondly, the courts could have laid down a "separate corporate identity" 
principle without granting that privilege in the Salomon case. That this is the 
case is borne out by the vast quantities of examples of situations where courts 
have since found it necessary to "pierce the veil" despite the existence of the 
principle. Limited liability is not actually a necessary consequence of 
recognition of separate corporate legal personality: it is quite possible to 
incorporate a separate legal entity which has unlimited liability.49 
Thirdly, the creditors who were ultimately held liable to bear the bulk of Mr 
Salomon's losses were trade creditors, or "contract" creditors. No "tort" debts 
were at issue. 
48 To borrow the term used in a perhaps-related context by Professor Prebble. 
49 See for example s 97 of the Companies Act 1993 which specifically envisages unlimited liability 
corn pan ies. 
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III THE INTERACTION OF COMPANY LAW AND TORT 
The doctrine of separate corporate personality and limited liability raises some 
interesting issues at the interface with the law of tort. This was evidenced by 
the case of Trevor Ivory. 
The question in Ivory concerned whether Mr Ivory, a director of a one-person 
company, owed a personal duty of care in addition to the duty owed by the 
company itself. It was argued that a personal duty of care would erode the 
principle in Salomon. That is, to find Mr Ivory personally liable when he acted 
as the company would effectively mean that his liability as a shareholder was 
not limited, at least with respect to the loss caused to the person harmed by the 
negligence. He and the company would not be effectively "separate". 
The extent of a director's personal liability for torts has traditionally followed 
normal tortious principles: 50 
An individual is liable for his own tortious conduct, and the mere fact that he 
commits a tort while on his principal's business does not relieve him of 
liability. In particular, the idea that company directors were to be treated 
"any more kindly than the servant" was thought by Slade LJ to "offend 
common sense" (C Evans & Sons Ltd v Spritebrand). 
The Court of Appeal case of South Pacific51 presented a multi-faceted 
approach to the determination of the existence or otherwise of a duty of care. 
That case, like Ivory, involved a negligent misstatement made in the context 
of a close contractual nexus. Their Honours specifically listed the ''integrity 
;o Ross Grantham "Company Directors and Tortious Liability" [ 1997] Cambridge LJ 259, 260. 
;i South Pacific Manufacturing Co Ltd v New Zealand Security Consultants and Investigations Ltd 
(1992) 2 NZLR 282 (CA) [South Pacific]. 
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of other legal principles" (such as the concept of limited liability) as a factor 
to be taken into account. 52 Cooke P (as he was then) stated that: 53 
... when a duty of care issue arises in a situation not clearly covered by 
existing authority the proper approach is to look at all the material facts in 
combination, in order to decide as a question of mixed law and fact whether 
or not liability should be imposed. 
Despite this, their Honours mentioned South Pacific only in passing. It will be 
necessary to return to South Pacific later. 
Of course, to the extent that the relevant act concerned negligent misstatement, 
the situation in Trevor Ivory was covered by existing authority. The House of 
Lords held in Hedley Byrne54 that if someone possessed of a "special skill 
undertakes, quite irrespective of contract, to apply that skill for someone who 
relies on it" then a duty to take care in statement will arise. 55 
Hedley Byrne was a ground-breaking decision. Traditionally, courts were 
reluctant to impose liability in the area of negligent misstatement for fear of 
"opening the floodgates". It was felt that reasonable people may make 
statements with less care than they afford their physical actions. Further, 
statements could be repeated a number of times without the defendant being 
able to disclaim the accuracy of the information. Finally, negligent 
misstatements were more likely than other negligent acts to create financial or 
"pure" economic loss. Negligence cases involving financial Joss had 
traditionally been particularly controversial "due in no small measure to the 
very considerable difficulty in drawing recognisable and coherent boundaries 
to liability".56 
52 Indeed, this was one factor which ultimately Jed to the finding that there was no duty or care in that 
case. 
53 South Pacific above n 51, 293 (emphasis added). 
'
4 Hed/ ey Byrne & Co v Heller & Partners Ltd [ 1964] AC 465 (HL) [Hedley Byrne]. 
" Hedley Byrne above n 54, 502 per Lord Morris. 
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In keeping with this view, the lower court in Hedley Byrne had held that a duty 
to take care in statement would only arise where there was a fiduciary 
relationship, an express or implied term in a contract, or some other special 
relationship which gave rise to a duty of care. The reference given by the bank 
to the advertising agency met none of those criteria. 
In overturning this finding, the House of Lords held that a relationship may be 
"special" enough to give rise to a duty to take care in making a direct 
statement to a plaintiff7 where: 
( a) the plaintiff was relying on the advice; 
(b) it was reasonable for the plaintiff to so rely; and 
( c) the defendant knew or ought to have known that the plaintiff was 
relying on him or her. 
The banker' s reference situation was therefore sufficient to create a duty 
because the advertising agency had clearly reasonably relied on the 
defendants ' advice and had done so to the defendants ' knowledge. 
Nevertheless, no liability ultimately arose because the advice was issued 
"without responsibility on the part of this bank" . In other words, a reasonable 
disclaimer was held to be sufficient to avoid a duty of care. 
The New Zealand courts considered Hedley Byrne in 1975 in the case of 
Capital Motors. 58 In that case, it was held that a used-car salesperson owed a 
duty to take care in giving information to a buyer concerning the number of 
previous owners of a car. Cooke J (as he was then) held that the relationship 
was sufficiently special to give rise to a duty because, in such a situation, there 
had been an assumption of responsibility by someone who ought to be in a 
position of knowledge. 
16 Tod_d above n 7, 11 . 
17 Or a plaintiffs agent. 
18 Capital Motors Ltd v Beecham (I 975) I NZLR 576 (SC) [Capital Motors]. 
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Further, an exclusion condition in the contract of sale did not amount to a 
sufficient disclaimer of liability: 59 
... the relevance of such a condition in tort, as shown in Hedley Byrne, is that 
if may be part of the material from which one deduces whether a duty of care 
was assumed ... This is a question of fact and there is no finding ... that either 
the purchaser or the salesman even had it in mind when the latter undertook 
to check and conveyed the alleged result of doing so ... On the facts of this 
case I do not think that the condition negated a duty of care. 
In 1983, in Meates v Attorney-General, 60 the Court of Appeal held that the 
situation of a politician making statements concerning government policy 
called for special skill and knowledge. Further, the politician-defendant had 
held himself out as possessing that special skill or knowledge. A duty of care 
was owed. 
The damage caused in Meates was financial only, but this could not preclude a 
duty on the part of the Crown: any such argument would be an 
"anachronism".61 Further, Cooke J (as he was then) considered it "artificial" to 
distinguish between statements and other actions: "the duty of the 
Govenrn1ent ... was to take reasonable care, both in what was said and in what 
was done".62 
Consequently, at the time of the Trevor Ivory case, it was sufficient in New 
Zealand for a duty to arise to take care in a statement given directly to a 
plaintif£63 if the advice was given in a professional capacity or in the ordinary 
course of business, with knowledge that the plaintiff was relying on the advice 
and where it was reasonable for the plaintiff to so rely. 
19 Capital Mo1ors above n 58, 580 per Cooke J. 
60 l\lleates v Allorney-Ceneral [ 1983) NZLR 308 (CA) [Meales]. 
61 Meates above n 60, 378 per Cooke J. 
62 Mea/es above n 60, 379 . 
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More recently, the House of Lords set down some governing principles in the 
area of negligent misstatement in the case of Henderson v Merritt Syndicates. 64 
It will be necessary to return to this case later as well. 
The cases of Caparo65 and Scott Group66 concern negligent misstatements 
which were not made directly to the plaintiffs. Instead, the plaintiffs in those 
cases relied on auditors ' reports contained in financial statements. In 
considering whether defendants owe a duty of care in such indirect 





did the defendant know that the statement would be 
communicated directly or indirectly to the class of plaintiffs of 
which the plaintiff was a member; 
was the defendant fully aware of the nature of the transaction 
the plaintiff had in contemplation; 
did the defendant know it was very likely that the plaintiff 
would rely on the advice in deciding whether or not to enter 
into the transaction. 
These additional requirements may be thought of as a desire to avoid auditors ' 
liability "of an indeterminate amount for an indeterminate time to an 
indeterminate class" .67 
Mr Ivory gave his advice directly to the plaintiffs in the ordinary course of 
business, aware (or he ought to have been) that the particular plaintiffs were 
reasonably relying on it. This placed the case squarely within the Hedley 
Byrne principle as applied by Capital Motors and Meates. However, the case 
63 Or a plaintiffs agent. 
64 Henderson v Merritt Syndicates ( I 995) 2 AC 145 (HL). 
65 Caparo Industries PLC v Dickman [1990] 2 AC 605 (HL) [Caparo] 
66 Scott Group ltdv McFar/ane (1978) I N ZLR 576 (CA) [Scott Group]. 
67 To quote the famous phrase. 
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of Trevor Ivory had an additional complicating factor not shared by the New 
Zealand authorities so far mentioned. Mr Ivory acted through a company. The 
Court of Appeal had to address the argument that imposing liability on Mr 
Ivory personally for this negligent misstatement would mean that the limited 
liability he sought in forming the company would not be achieved. Or, perhaps 
more correctly, limited liability would be achieved generally in the sense in 
which it was arguably intended, that is, with respect to trade or "contract" 
creditors. However, it would not be achieved where the consequences of his 
negligent misstatements had to be made good. Counsel for Mr Ivory argued 
that the statement was not his, it was the company's; Mr Ivory had acted not as 
himself but "as" the company; to find that he owed a personal duty to take 
care in these circumstances would undermine the principle in Salomon. 
Tort law is said to be about compensation. Deserving plaintiffs who suffer loss 
as a result of a defendant's negligence should have that loss made good, 
usually by an award of compensatory damages. Inherent in tort law are 
considerations of personal responsibility68 for damage negligently caused. A 
wrong should have a remedy:69 
The liability for negligence, whether you sty le it such or treat it as in other 
systems as a species of 'culpa' , is no doubt based upon a general public 
sentiment of moral wrongdoing for which the offender must pay. 
This is not to say that the perpetrator of a wrong should be punished as that is 
the realm of the criminal law (and one of the arguments against the civil 
imposition of exemplary damages). Nevertheless, the sanction of a negligence 
suit is argued to provide a "deterrent effect", or an incentive to take reasonable 
care. Cooke P has stated that the promotion of professional competence in this 
manner is an important social objective. 70 
68 Grantham above n 50, 262. 
69 Donoghue v Stevenson [ I 932] AC 562 , 580 (HL) per Lord Atkin . 
70 South Pacific above n 51, 294 per Cooke P. 
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Tort law can also be described in terms of economically-efficient allocation of 
a negligently-caused loss. In pursuit of this aim, and often implicitly rather 
than explicitly, it will ask questions such as which party is in the best position 
to bear the loss, or to avoid the "costs" of it most cheaply? Which party is the 
"best briber"? Economic efficiency is concerned with overall wealth and not 
the distribution of it, however; there may be "distributional" considerations 
such as equity or justice which might nevertheless cause the loss to be 
allocated to the "inefficient" party. 
The ground-breaking negligence case of Donoghue v Stevenson held in 1932, 
35 years after Salomon, that a manufacturer owed a duty of care to a person 
who was harmed by their product. Crucially, this duty extended to someone 
who had not actually purchased their product but who had received it as a gift 
from a friend. In other words, the law of tort "filled in" where there was no 
contract between the parties themselves.71 
More recently, the House of Lords considered the issue of personal duty of 
care of a director of a "one-person" company in the context of the direct 
negligent misstatement of the company. The case of Williams and Another v 
Natural Life Health Foods Limited and Mistlin72 presents an interesting 
comparison with ivory. 
IV THE DECISIONS IN TREVOR IVORY AND WILLIAMS 
A Comparison on the Facts 
The House of Lords found in the Williams case that the director did not 
personally owe a duty of care. However, both the result and the reasoning in 
Williams seem easier to accept than in Ivory. That this is the case might be 
71 Todd above n 7, 531 . 
72 Williams above n 11. 
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partially explained through a consideration of the nature of the company and 
the nature of the act done. 
1. The nature of the company 
Both Trevor Ivory and Williams present a familiar tripartite structure: 73 
73 A similar tripartite structure is also apparent in the cases of Donoghue v Stevenson and South Pacific. 
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Like Mr Ivory, Mr Mistlin was director and principal shareholder of his 
company: Natural Life Health Foods Ltd (NLHF Ltd). Despite the existence of 
a nominal shareholder, both companies were effectively "one-person" . 
Mr Mistlin had started to work in the health food trade in 1980, and had 
owned and operated an apparently successful health food shop since 1983. In 
1986, he formed a company to franchise the concept of health foods under the 
trade name "Natural Life Health Foods" . 
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Unlike Mr Ivory's company, NLHF Ltd, employed two staff: S and P (and it 
seems the nominal shareholder was somewhat more actively involved in the 
business). This makes the company less "one-person" in nature, and must 
lessen the element of "surprise" that seems inherent in Ivory. When a company 
has more substance apart from the director him- or herself, it seems less likely 
that a potential tort victim would be lulled into a false sense of security that a 
director is personally standing behind the debts of such a company74 (when in 
fact the director is not). 
In addition, the argument that a company was created "for the purpose of 
protection in respect of personal responsibility" must be: 75 
... that much greater when there are employees of the company who could 
make errors unknown to the principal shareholder than in a 
case ... where . .. there were no such employees. 
It seems reasonable to protect one's personal wealth from the consequences of 
the negligent acts of other people. Further, a company which has employees is 
more likely to have insurance or capital available in order to cover its exposure 
to vicarious liability for employees' acts. This means there is potentially more 
inherent coverage for a tort victim with such a company, and less need to look 
to a director personally. 
A principal difference between the two companies, however, seems to be that 
Mr Mistlin's company was more clearly separate from Mr Mistlin, and more 
clearly a "thing" in itself. In such a situation, a plaintiff is less likely to be 
"hoodwinked" into underestimating the significance of the request "can I put 
this thrnugh the company?" (particularly in the context of invoices that refer to 
a director ' s services personally). 
74 See Prentice above n 18, 35 for a discussion of this point in the context of company groups. 
75 Livingstone v Bonifant ( 1995) 7 NZCLC 260,657 , 260,665 per Doogue J cited in Andrew 
Borrowdale "Liability of Directors in Tort - Developments in New Zealand" [ 1998] Journal of 
Business Law 96, I 04 ["Developments in New Zealand"]. 
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Also, Trevor Ivory Ltd was in the business of providing advice and advice 
businesses are personal in nature almost by definition. It seems reasonable for 
a plaintiff to rely on a director of a one-person company for advice paid for in 
the course of this sort of business (certainly in comparison to the type of 
business that was conducted by Mr Mistlin 's company). This point is returned 
to later. 
2. The nature of the act done 
Of course, irrespective of the nature of the two businesses, the advice given in 
the Williams case was quite different to, and given in quite a different context 
to, the advice given in Ivory. Some discussion of the two contexts might be 
necessary. 
Initial contact between the plaintiffs in the lvoty case and Mr Ivory himself 
had occurred in late 1982, when Mr Ivory 's company had sold them some 
sprays. In March 1983 , the plaintiffs were looking for a consultant to take over 
where their previous consultancy company had left off; they wanted someone 
to be responsible for regular supervision of their raspberry orchard, and for all 
important decisions relating to the management of the crops. 76 The Ivory 
family name and indeed Mr Ivory himself were known to Mr Anderson as 
being well recognised in the field. 77 Mr and Mrs Anderson therefore 
approached Mr Ivory to work with their manager on a back-up basis . Mr Ivory 
agreed, although there was no discussion of fee or contractual arrangements. 78 
Later in 1983 this matured into an oral contract between Trevor Ivory Ltd and 
the plaintiffs for the provision of consultancy services in return for an annual 
fee of $5000. Sprays and fertilisers were also to be supplied by the company 
and paid for as required. 
76 Trevor Jvo,y above n 5, 530. 
71 Trevor Ivory above n 5, 53 I . 
78 Trevor Ivory above n 5, 53 I. 
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The company's invoices contained exemption clauses, however, these were 
found to apply to products supplied only and not to the advice. In addition, 
while the invoices for the annual advice fees were on company letterhead, they 
referred to "consultancy fees 'for' or 'by' TA Ivory". 79 This represented to the 
plaintiffs that they were receiving Mr Ivory's personal advice. 80 Indeed, it had 
been imp01iant to the plaintiffs to have "personal involvement" by Mr Ivory, 
their consultant; 81 it was the personal or one-person aspect of his business 
which had appealed to them. 82 
In 1985, the plaintiffs sought Mr Ivory's advice under the agreement 
regarding the couch grass which they thought threatened the raspberry crop. 
The advice to use Roundup was found to have been negligent in that it omitted 
to include an instruction to cover the vines and/or mow the grass before 
spraying the weedkiller on it. 
The context in the Williams case, on the other hand, is quite different. The 
plaintiffs in that case, Mr Williams and Mrs Reid, approached Mr Mistlin's 
new company with a view to obtaining a franchise to open a health food shop 
in Rugby. They asked for and were given a brochure which described the 
company's team in glowing terms and extolled Mr Mistlin 's previous 
successes in the health food trade. The company also sent detailed financial 
projections to the plaintiffs which demonstrated the suitability of the proposed 
premises and the likely future profitability of their shop. All material pre-
contractual documents were on company letterhead. 
Encouraged by and relying on this advice, the plaintiffs entered into a written 
contract with the company in 1987 through which they purchased a franchise 
to open their health food shop. 
79 Trevor Ivory above n 5, 524 per Cooke P. 
80 Trevor Ivory above n 5, 524. 
81 Trevor Ivory above n 5, 531 per McGechan J. 
82 Trevor Ivory above n 5, 525 per Heron J. 
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The advice which was found to have been negligent in the Williams case was 
principally that the projections were inaccurate. The plaintiffs' shop closed 
within 18 months, having made a loss of some £31,000 instead of a projected 
profit of £38,000. 83 
A personal duty of care was disputed in the Ivory case because Mr Ivory had 
"at no time held himself out as engaging in the supply of agricultural or 
horticultural materials and the accompanying advisory service other than by 
way of this limited liability company".84 His evidence was that he was 
consciously trading through his company, on advice, bearing in mind the 
possible risks involved in the spray business. 85 It was found that Mr Ivory had 
at some unspecified time asked if he could "put the [advice] charges through 
his company",86 which request was accepted by the plaintiffs, understanding 
that Mr Ivory would be the "man on the ground". The Andersons wanted the 
expertise which Mr Ivory carried in his head and were unconcerned with the 
formalities of the legal relationship as long as Mr Ivory himself did the actual 
work. 87 However, in the final analysis, it seems fair to say that "neither the 
plaintiffs nor the company thought about what each other considered was the 
nature of the legal relationship involved". 88 Neither seems to have turned their 
mind to the perception of the other,89 and in the normal course of events, so 
long as Mr Ivory did the work and the company was paid, it would not have 
mattered . 
The personal duty of care was disputed in Williams, however, because the 
plaintiffs did not know and had not dealt with Mr Mistlin personally in any 
83 Andrew Borrowdale "Directors ' Liability for Corporate Misstatements" ( 1997) 3 NZ Business Law 
Quarterly 211, 212 ["Corporate Misstatements"]. 
84 Trevor lvmy above n 5, 531 per Heron J. 
8
' Trevor lvo,y above n 5, 531. The trial Judge also found that tax reasons were not the motivation for 
Mr Ivory confining contractual relationships to the company. 
86 Trevor Ivory above n 5, 531. 
87 Trevor Ivory above n 5, 532. 
88 Fridman above n 7, 54. 
89 Trevor Ivory above n 5, 532. 
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pre-contractual matters of importance; instead they had dealt through an 
independent consultant and an employee of the company. In fact, Mr Mistlin 
had no direct role in the commission of the tort: the financial projections had 
been compiled by the independent consultant90 (although Mr Mistlin had seen 
and approved them before they were given to the plaintiffs). 
The relationship between the parties m the Williams case has more of a 
character of a one-off arms' -length investment deal, than the ongoing business 
relationship of the Ivory case. The Williams received advice from a party who 
was clearly biased as the very nature of the NLHF business was to persuade 
people to invest in the NLHF concept. There is likely to be "puffery" in such a 
situation and this factor alone should have been sufficient to put the plaintiffs 
in Williams on their guard. Indeed, they did seek independent legal advice (at 
least in relation to the franchise contract).91 
Both sets of plaintiffs suffered loss as a result of a negligent misstatement. In 
both cases, the lower court(s) found that the company and the director 
personally were liable to the plaintiffs. Both directors appealed against the 
findings of personal liability. 
The lower courts in the Williams case had had to deal with the fact that Mr 
Mistlin had been somewhat removed from dealings with the plaintiffs. While 
the advice in the Ivory case might be characterised as having been given 
direclly to the plaintiffs, Mr Mistlin ' s personal role in the advice might be 
more analogous to the " indirect" auditor cases. The trial judge in Williams 
found that the indirect nature of Mr Mistlin ' s involvement was immaterial92 
because he "must have known that any potential franchisee would expect the 
projections to have his personal stamp of approval, based on his earlier 
90 "Corporate Misstatements" above n 83 , 212. 
9 1 David Goddard "The 1993 Act Comes Into Its Own" [ 1997] Company and Securities Law Bulletin 
94, 94 ["Goddard" ]. 
92 Williams above n I I, I 53 . 
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experience".93 The English Court of Appeal upheld this result: the company 
had held itself out as having the expertise to provide reliable advice to 
franchisees, and the brochure had made it clear that this expertise derived from 
Mr Mistlin 's experience in the operation of his Salisbury shop. Personal 
liability should be sheeted home to Mr Mistlin because the: 94 
... skill and experience offered by the company were in fact to be found in Misti in 
a lone, since on ly he had had any involvement in the health food trade, and 
Mistlin's experience had been acquired not in his capacity as a director of Natural 
Life Health Foods Ltd, but in his personal capacity. 
The House of Lords had little difficulty in overturning this finding and with 
respect, this must be right. Focussing on the manner in which knowledge and 
experience had come to be acquired arguably only confuses the issue of 
whether a director personally owed a duty of care. By definition, knowledge 
and experience is personal to the person who acquired it. If the result turned on 
the capacity in which a director had acquired his or her relevant expertise, no 
company could effectively run an advice business.95 The New Zealand Court 
of Appeal overturned the finding of negligence against Mr Ivory personally for 
different reasons. Mr Ivory was perhaps more alive now to the consequences 
of Round up than he was at the time of giving the advice,96 but nevertheless it 
was held that he did not personally owe a duty of care. 
In both cases, the findings against the companies remained, however, clearly 
both companies were unlikely to have had sufficient funds to meet the claims 
against them. The plaintiffs' loss in both cases would therefore effectively 
have gone uncompensated. 
93 " Corporate Misstatements" above n 83, 212 . 
94 " Corporate Misstatements" above n 83 , 213. 
9
' For support for this argument see "Corporate Misstatements" above n 83, 213 and Goddard above n 
91, 94 . 
96 Trevor Ivory above n 5, 519. 
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The claim for compensation in Williams is clearly less morally strong than in 
Ivory. It has more of an air of a search for a deep pocket rather than a genuine 
moral feeling that this director should make right this wrong. 
If negligence in the Williams case could be sheeted home to the consultant 
who actually prepared the projections, presumably the company would have 
been vicariously liable for that negligence. Perhaps the plaintiffs could have 
pursued the consultant. However, there was no reasonable reliance on Mr 
Mistlin personally, or on the projections at all. Projections are simply 
predictions, and can never be safely relied upon: no one can predict the future. 
They can be even less safely relied on in a situation where there is likely to be 
"puffery". 97 
The advice in Williams was merely one of several factors the plaintiffs should 
have taken into account in exercising their business judgement (as to whether 
to enter into this venture). It was given in order to persuade the plaintiffs to 
"join up", for no payment by the plaintiffs (the payment in the case was for the 
franchise, the decision to purchase which had been made after the freely-given 
advice had been considered). Of course, the fact of payment is not 
determinative for the tort action. However, the fact that the advice was given 
gratis was another factor which should have put the plaintiffs on their guard 
that it was not reasonable to rely on it. 
By contrast, it is significant that the negligent act in Jv01y occurred in the 
context of a business relationship which had already been going for two years 
at the time the act occurred. This relationship was characterised by the 
significant degree of trust the Andersons had obviously placed in Mr Ivory 
over a period of time, evidenced partly perhaps by the fact that the contract 
through which the arrangement was effected was " informal", not having been 
97 Arguably, Mr Mistlin 's business was not "promoting", however, in which case recent New Zealand 
authority would indicate there would be more of a case for making a director personally liable. See 
Jagivar Holdings Ltd v Julian ( 1992) 6 NZCLC 68,040. 
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reduced to writing other than through the invoices Mr Ivory periodically 
produced. On any analysis, Mr Ivory, whether through his company or not, 
was the Andersons' "consultant", for which he was paid a significant annual 
retainer. They sought advice from their retained consultant in the course of an 
ongoing business. Mr Ivory's advice on the other hand was reasonably 
expected to be correct. It was purchased for the purposes of relying on it. 
If the business judgement of the Williams' plaintiffs turns out to have been 
wrong, it seems reasonable that they should take some responsibility for that 
fact. There seems less reason for the law to support them in what seems to be a 
quest for "someone to blame". 
B The Judgements 
The comparison between the cases is particularly interesting in terms of the 
various approaches the judges took in reaching their conclusions of no 
personal liability. To some extent, an argument, that conclusions in this area of 
the interaction of company law and tort are often predicated by what one takes 
as one's starting point, is borne out by the judgements in the two cases. 
i . The New Zealand Court of Appeal 
(a) the starting point 
The New Zealand Court of Appeal were unanimous in finding that the starting 
point in determining whether or not Mr Ivory personally owed a duty of care 
was company law. Cooke P held that: 98 
In this field ... it behoves the Courts to avoid imposing on the owner of a one-
[person] company a personal duty of care which would erode the limited 
98 Trevor !vo1y above n 5, 523. 
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liability and separate identity principles associated with the names of Salomon 
and Lee. 
His Honour mentioned the case of South Pacific only tangentially and towards 
the end of his judgement.99 
Similarly, and despite acknowledging that the issue in the case concerned the 
interaction of two competing common law principles (the doctrine of separate 
corporate personality on the one hand, and of allowing an adequate remedy on 
the other), 100 Hardie Boys J also favoured company law: "the starting point 
must obviously be Salomon". 101 
On its face, the judgement of McGechan J seems more based on first-
principles. The case of South Pacific was not mentioned, but his Honour 
nevertheless acknowledged that duty of care issues in a negligent word context 
are prima facie governed by the foundation case of Hedley Byrne. 
However, his Honour analysed that case in an unexpected way. In Hedley 
Byrne, it was held that a reasonable person who knew he [sic] was being 
trusted, or his judgement and skill were being relied on, and who gave an 
answer without a clear qualification that he accepted no responsibility for it, 
must: 102 
... be held to have accepted some responsibility for his answer being given 
carefully, or to have a accepted a relationship with the inquirer which requires him 
to exercise such care as the circumstances require. 
In other words, the standard for an assumption of responsibility, the 
"touchstone" of liability in the negligent word context, was decidedly low in 
Hedley Byrne. (It is confusing that his Honour also considered that assumption 
9
'! Trevor Ivory above n 5, 523 and 524. 
100 Trevor lv0ty above 11 5, 525. 
101 Trevor lv0ty above 11 5, 525. 
102 Trevor Ivory above n 5, 530. 
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of responsibility was the issue in the Fair line I 03 case, as that case concerned a 
negligent act not a statement). 
Analysing the Ivory case in terms of whether Mr Ivory had personally 
assumed responsibility for the advice given might therefore have seemed 
reasonably straight-forward: the Andersons had sought Mr Ivory's advice 
personally with respect to the orchard which constituted their livelihood; Mr 
Ivory knew that; the relationship generally had a decidedly personal character; 
in fact, the company was almost "invisible" to the Andersons; the Andersons 
were relying on Mr Ivory personally, to Mr Ivory 's knowledge. Prima facie, 
there seems clearly to have been an assumption of responsibility, objectively 
determined, on the part of Mr I vary. 
However, McGechan found that that was not the case. Unexpectedly, his 
Honour distinguished Hedley Byrne on the facts. 104 There seems almost to be 
an assumption that the existence of a limited liability company rendered the 
"assumption of responsibility" test for negligent misstatement considerably 
higher in this context. Unfortunately, however, his Honour does not articulate 
that assumption. 
Such an assumption certainly does not seem indicated by the authorities of 
Capital Motors and Meates (which were also distinguishable on the facts of 
Hedley Byrne). His Honour simply states that: 105 
It may indeed be drawing the long bow to apply a Hedley Byrne approach so as to 
impose personal liability upon the managing director of a one-[person] company, 
in rural New Zealand, engaged in the high-risk business of horticultural spray 
advice, who has exhibited a considerable anxiety to limit liability by insulating 
himself through corporate protection . 
103 Fairline Shipping Corporation v Adamson [ 1975] QB 180. 
104 Trevor Ivory above n 5, 530. 
105 Trevor Ivory above n 5, 530. 
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However, the question of why it would not also be drawing the long bow to 
allocate this loss to the Andersons, who are also in rural New Zealand, who 
paid handsomely for the advice they received, and who had exhibited a no-
doubt equally-considerable degree of anxiety to secure Mr Ivory's services 
personally, (which clear focus was acknowledged by his Honour to be 
"unsurprising" in an advisory relationship) 106 is not made clear. 
Despite couching the issue in terms of a balancing between the Andersons' 
"clear focus" on Mr Ivory 's personal services, and Mr Ivory 's "clear desire" to 
distance himself from personal liability, it seems clear that McGechan J, as 
with the other members of the Court of Appeal, gives a primacy to company 
law:1 01 
When it comes down to an assumption of responsibility, I do not accept a 
company director of a one-[person] company is to be regarded as automatically 
accepting tort responsibility for advice given on behalf of the company by 
himself. 
That might be the case where a director is "highly prominent" in comparison 
to the company, but such was not the case here (although it is difficult to see 
on the facts how much more highly prominent Mr Ivory could have been). 
(b) the importance of the " identification" concept 
Having reached a clear conclusion that company law was the starting point, 
Cooke P and Hardie Boys J went on to consider the "identification" concept. 
Cooke P began his judgement by noting a distinction between the company 
law concepts of "separate identity" and "identification". However, the fact that 
a company is separate from its shareholder(s), when dealing with questions 
between shareholder(s) and the company, does not inform the status of a 
106 Trevor lvo,y above n 5, 531. 
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company and its directors when they deal with the outside world. This of 
course was the situation in Ivory. 
Hardie Boys J also noted that Salomon was concerned with the limited liability 
of shareholders and not the liability of directors towards third parties, but 
considered that Lee 108 came "closer to that topic". The principle in Lee is 
challengeable. 109 Further, it is not quite clear how a finding that a company and 
a director/employee are indeed separate would have been helpful to Mr Ivory. 
Would not separate identity between of a company and a director indicate 
separate liability, unencumbered by considerations of amounts paid up on 
shares? Would this not indicate a personal duty of care on the part of Mr Ivory 
therefore? Their Honours do not elaborate on the case of Lee. 
This is particularly confusing given their Honours' ensumg discussion of 
Tesco. 110 Tesco held that a person may be identified with a company so as to be 
its "embodiment or directing mind and will, not merely its servant, 
representative, agent or delegate". 111 Cooke P interpolated from this finding 
that if a person is identified with a company vis-a-vis third parties, "it is 
reasonable that prima facie the company should be the only party liable". 11 2 
Hardie Boys J also effectively based his reasoning on the finding that the 
concept of corporate personality means that for some purposes directors and 
the company are one. As Mr Ivory had acted "as" the company in a manner 
sufficient to render the company liable for the advice, Mr Ivory had therefore 
not also acted as himself. 
The case of Tesco concerned the attribution of guilt from a natural person to a 
company. The case recognised that a company itself could not think or act, but 
could only do so through its directors. In identifying a director with a 
107 Trevor Ivory above 11 5, 532. 
108 Lee above 11 38. 
109 See above 11 38. 
110 Tesco Supermarkets Ltd v Nallras ( 1971) 2 All ER 127 (HL). 
111 Trevor Ivory above 115, 520. 
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company, it was therefore possible to sheet liability home to the company 
itself. However, this was not to the exclusion of personal liability on the part 
of the natural person. It is not clear on what basis the concept of identification 
is so extrapolated. Hardie Boys J stated that he found no difficulty in the 
imposition of personal liability on a director in appropriate circumstances; the 
purpose of incorporation, namely the limited liability of shareholders, "affords 
no reason" to protect directors from the consequences of their own acts and 
omissions. However: 11 3 
What does run counter to the purposes and effect of incorporation is a failure 
to recognise the two capacities in which directors may act; that in appropriate 
circumstances they are to be identified with the company itself so that their 
acts are in truth the company's acts. Indeed, I consider that the nature of 
corporate personality requires that this identification normally be the basic 
premise and that clear evidence be needed to displace it with a finding that a 
director is acting not as the company but as the company's agent or servant 
in a way that renders him personally liable. 
Cooke P put the consequences of this in the following terms: 114 
It is not to be doubted that, in relation to an obligation to give careful skill 
and advice, the owner of a one-[person] company may assume personal 
responsibility .. . But ... something special is required to justify putting a case 
in that class ... there is nothing out of the ordinary here. 
In other words, their Honours hold that the nature of corporate personality is 
such that, where a director 11 5 has acted "as" a company in such a way as to 
render the company liable for the tort of negligent misstatement, the director 
will be absolved from personal liability unless a plaintiff can show that the 
director met a significantly-raised threshold of actual or imputed assumption 
of responsibility. 
112 Trevor lvo,y above n 5, 520 per Hardie Boys J (emphasis added). 
11 3 Trevor !vo,y above n 5, 527 (emphasis added). 
114 Trevor Ivory above n 5, 524 (emphasis added). 
1
" Or an employee. 
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The reasons why the threshold must be so much higher than was the case in 
Hedley Byrne are not clearly articulated; however, the explanation must of 
course stem from the initial emphasis placed on company law. Their Honours 
seem to hold that where a reconciliation of the two competing common law 
principles is required in this area, tort law must simply give way to company 
law. 
( c) assumption of responsibility 
Having reached a conclusion of effective deference to company law in this 
context, the Court of Appeal had little difficulty in finding that Mr Ivory had 
not assumed the prescribed higher standard of personal responsibility on the 
evidence. Cooke P considered that Mr Ivory's "repeated comments" that he 
was acting through his company meant that the plaintiffs were not able to 
prove that they had reasonably thought they were dealing with Mr Ivory 
personally. 11 6 It would not be "reasonable" to say that Mr Ivory had assumed a 
duty of care as if he were in business on his own account and not through a 
company: 117 
... the realistic interpretation is simp ly that Mr Ivory was identifying himself 
with his company, as if he had read the Tesco case. 
It was argued that a one-person company might on its own amount to an 
assumption of responsibility. Hardie Boys J considered on the contrary that it 
might rather be seen as a personal disclaimer of such responsibility (although 
his Honour did acknowledge academic criticism of that view).' 18 
Consequently, despite the fact that a contra preferentim doctrine might place 
the onus on the person who wanted to claim a privilege such as limited 
11 6 In Turning Points above n 28, 18 n 51, Lord Cooke states that the result would probably have been 
different if they had. 
117 Trevor Ivory above n 5, 523. 
118 Trevor fvo,y above n 5, 528. 
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liability, the mere existence of a company1 19 put the onus on the plaintiffs to 
"adduce clear evidence that in his dealings with them, Mr Ivory was not 
simply acting as the company". 120 Hardie Boys J found no such evidence 
although the case did "approach the borderline". Also, there might have been 
such an assumption if Mr Ivory had undertaken to do the spraying himself, 
although with respect, it is difficult to see what difference that would have 
made. 121 
McGechan found that a duty of care on Mr Ivory personally would not be "just 
and reasonable", although again the case "approached the line". The fact that 
Mr Ivory "retained an insulating corporate structure to guard against the 
disasters which the spray business can bring" 122 meant that the plaintiffs "did 
not perceive Mr Ivory as the contracting or advising party in his own right". 123 
(d) the authorities, including Morton 
The Court of Appeal's deference to company law is all the more confusing for 
the manner in which the relevant authorities are handled. 
Cooke P acknowledged that the finding of prima facie sole company liability, 
will neve1iheless not always hold; there will be circumstances where an officer 
or servant of a company, even a governing director, may in the course of 
activities on behalf of the company, come under a personal duty to a third 
party. 124 His Honour considered nine cases on this point, seven of which at 
least did find the director to be personally liable. 125 Why these were not 
determinative of the case at hand is not precisely clear; his Honour simply 
119 Trevor Ivory above n 5, 528. 
120 Trevor Ivory above n 5, 528. 
12 1 See for example the comments in " Developments in New Zealand" above n 75, l 04. 
122 Trevor Ivory above n 5, 532 . 
123 Trevor Ivory above n 5, 532. 
124 Trevor Ivory above n 5, 520. 
125 Joint tortfeasorship is a lso not di scussed, despite, Trevor lvo,y above n 5, 520, the rais ing of the 
case of Yuille v B & B Fisheries (Leigh) Ltd (1958) 2 Lloyd ' s Rep 596 [Yuille]. In Yuille, the company 
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stated that the English authorities "left the issue fairly open as far as principle 
is concerned". 126 
In addition, two New Zealand cases, Centrepac 127 and Morton, 128 directly 
pointed to personal liability being correctly imposed on Mr Ivory. Cooke 
acknowledged that Morton was "at first sight helpful" to the plaintiffs, 
however, neither case was either clearly adopted or clearly overruled. His 
Honour simply stated that it was not necessary to consider Morton because it 
was being distinguished in the judgement of Hardie Boys J. 
With respect, however, that was not the case. Hardie Boys J simply stated 129 
that an assumption of responsibility may well arise where a director exercises 
particular control or control over a particular operation or activity: 130 
This is perhaps more likely to arise within a large company where there are 
clear allocations of responsibility, than in a small one. It arose however in 
the case of a small company in Morton ... but not in a case to which I made 
some reference in my judgement in Morton, namely Callaghan v Robert 
Ronayne Ltd. 
With respect, this does not distinguish Morton. In fact, it raises the question of 
the significance of the fact that Mr Ivory undoubtedly did exercise "control" in 
his small company. Again there seems to be an unstated , underlying view that 
company law simply must have primacy in this area. It will be necessary to 
return to Morton later. 
( e) the "elevated harms" of personal and property damage 
and the director were found to be joint to11feasors for the negligent action of sending unseawo11hy 
vessels to sea. 
126 Trevor Ivory above n 5, 522. 
127 Centrepac Partnership v Foreign Currency Consultants Ltd ( 1989) 4 NZCLC 64,940. 
128 Morton v Douglas Homes Ltd ( 1984) 2 NZLR 548 (HC). 
129 Trevor !vo,y above n 5, 527. 
110 Trevor Ivory above n 5,527. 
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Finally, having found Mr Ivory not to be personally liable in this case, Cooke 
P confusingly articulated three scenarios where the principle in the case will 
not hold. A director may not avail him- or herself of the Trevor Ivory "safe 
harbour" 131 where the relevant action gave rise to a breach of a fiduciary duty 
or to one of two "elevated harms": personal injury, and property damage or 
other economic loss as a result of an intentional tort. 
The damage in the instant case was physical damage to raspberry vines and 
consequential financial Joss. This "economic loss" had been caused 
negligently but unintentionally. The significance of this, in his Honour's view, 
was that it became: 132 
... especially important to consider how far the duty asserted would cut 
across patterns of law evolved over the years in the process of balancing 
interests ... In the instant case it is patent that the object of Mr Ivory in 
forming a limited liability company, an object encouraged by long-
established legislative policy, would be undermined by imposing personal 
liability. 
Whether limited liability for one-person companies is an object encouraged by 
long-established legislative policy is a matter of debate.
133 Nevertheless, his 
Honour concluded by stating that:
134 
... when he formed his company, Mr Ivory made it plain to all the world that 
limited liability was intended. Possibly the plaintiffs gave little thought to 
that in entering into the consultancy contract; but such a limitation is a 
131 I borrow this term from Bob Dugan's Business Asso9iations Lectures Victoria University of 
Wellington, 1997. 
132 Trevor Ivory above n 5, 524. 
133 The legislation which was considered in Salomon was not intended to extend the privilege of limited 
liability to one-person companies. One person companies were specifically prohibited in New Zealand 
by the Companies Act I 955 . The removal of this prohibition in the Companies Act 1993 might be seen 
as more of a resignation of the fact that the prohibition was notoriously difficult to circumvent than any 
direct legislative policy to encourage them. This is particularly the case given how arguably 
inappropriate for one-person companies the 1993 Act is . This is di scussed further below. 
134 Trevor Ivory above n 5, 524. 
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common fact of business and, in relation to economic loss ... , the 
consequences should ... be accepted in the absence of special circumstances. 
Again it seems odd that the plaintiffs in the Ivory case should receive harsher 
treatment simply because the destruction of their raspberry orchard amounted 
to "merely" economic loss.
135 New Zealand courts would not normally make 
these distinctions today. It will be necessary to return to this point after a 
discussion of the judgement in the Williams case. 
2. The House of Lords 
(a) the starting point 
The House of Lords in Williams adopted a different approach in reaching their 
unanimous finding of no personal liability. In reaching their decision, their 
Lordships found it unnecessary to embark on a general review of the 
authorities, stating that the principles governing the case were clearly those 
enunciated by Lord Goff in Henderson. 
136 The "wide" assumption of 
responsibility principle enunciated in Hedley Byrne was not confined to 
statements but may apply to any assumption of responsibility for the provision 
of services. This "extended Hedley Byrne" principle is the "rationalisation or 
technique adopted by English Jaw to provide a remedy for the recovery of 
damages in respect of economic loss caused by the negligent performance of 
services". 137 
In other words, their Lordships did not consider that the existence of a 
company removed the need to perform a standard tort analysis. Their 
Lordships acknowledged Trevor Ivory and the English Court of Appeal ' s 
135 Interestingly, His I lonour focuses on the nature of the damage and not the !act that the actual wrong
ful action 
invol ved words rather than conduct. Traditi onally, the law has been readier to impose liability for 
an act rather 
than a comment. I lowever, the nature or the relationship is so cl ose in this case that a duty would n
ot have been 
prec luded on a " negligent word" basis alone - the primary concern or allowing liability for negl ig
ent words is 
arguably floodgates which surely would not apply here. 
136 Henderson above n 64 . 
137 Williams above n 1 1, 4 . 
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finding that the general principle in this area must not "set at naught" the 
protection of limited liability. 138 However, they considered that the issue in the 
case was not peculiar to companies: 139 
Whether the principal is a company or a natural person, someone acting on 
his behalf may incur personal liability in tort as well as imposing vicarious or 
attributed liability upon his principal. 
Their Lordships consequently simply applied a standard negligent-
misstatement analysis to the director personally. Essentially, the issue was 
whether the requirements of Hedley Byrne were satisfied. Was there a "special 
relationship" between the plaintiffs and Mr Mistlin personally such that Mr 
Mistlin himself could be said to have owed a duty of care? 
(b) the importance of the "identification" concept 
While Mr Mistlin was argued to play a "pivotal role" in the affairs of the 
company, the issue of his "identification" with the company did not arise: P, 
not Mr Mistlin, had acted on behalf of the company. 
140 
It might be argued, however, that the standard tort approach would have 
flushed out the fallacy of the identification argument in the course of analysis 
anyway. It certainly would have prevented the conclusive influence the 
concept was afforded in two of the Ivory judgements. The question at issue 
was whether Mr Mistlin owed a duty of care; clearly he had acted irrespective 
of whether or not he had also acted as the company. The identification concept 
is discussed further below. 
118 Williams above n 11, 4. 
139 Williams above n I I, 4. 
(c) assumption of responsibility 
140 P is not alleged to have acted "as" the company, from a reading of the House of Lords' judgement. 
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As mentioned, the Court of Appeal considered that the impact of company law 
in this area was such that the threshold for assumption of responsibility should 
be significantly higher than that predicated by Hedley Byrne. 
The House of Lords addressed the issue in a different way. For Mr Mistlin to 
be liable, it was necessary to point to objective evidence of conduct "crossing 
the line" which conveyed to the plaintiffs that there was an assumption of 
responsibility by the director such as to create a "special relationship" between 
the plaintiffs and the director himself. Further, there must be the reliance on 
that assumption of responsibility by the plaintiffs, objectively determined, in 
order to establish causation. 
14 1 Arguably, this is simply a "classic negligent 
misstatement tort duty analysis" . 
On the facts, as Mr Mistlin had had no personal dealings with the plaintiffs, 
there was nothing which could have conveyed that he was assuming a personal 
responsibility to them. 142 Further, there was no evidence that the plaintiffs even 
believed Mr Mistlin was undertaking a personal responsibility to them. 
Criticism of the principle of assumption ofresponsibility was acknowledged in 
the case. However, their Lordships considered that there was a gap in the 
present structure of contract law caused by the principles of consideration and 
privity. This gap must be filled by tort, and in that role there was, and is, "no 
better rationalisation for the relevant head of tort liability than assumption of 
responsibility". 143 
There was no indication that the threshold for that assumption of responsibility 
should be higher than in other negligent misstatement contexts. There was no 
sense in the judgement that company law, and Salomon, must simply be 
deferred to in this context. 
141 Williams above n I I, 6. 
142 Williams above n I I, 7. 
141 Williams above n 11 , 7. 
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( d) the elevated harms 
Their Lordships seemed distinctly unconcerned that the loss caused in the 
Williams case was financial, or "pure" economic loss, unconnected with any 
physical damage. Arguably, they did not need to consider this point as they 
had already found that a duty of care did not exist. Nevertheless, their 
Lordships stated that once a case was identified as falling within the "extended 
Hedley Byrne principle", there was no need to embark on any further enquiry 
whether it is "fair, just and reasonable" to impose liability for economic loss.
144 
This presents a marked contrast to the judgement of Cooke P in the Court of 
Appeal. 
(e) conclusion 
The House of Lords reached their conclusion of no personal liability on the 
part of the director in a manner that was arguably much more open and much 
more consistent with authority. There was no unstated deference to Salomon to 
the exclusion of a standard tort analysis. However, the cases of Williams and 
Ivory are not altogether inconsistent: Lord Cooke has stated extra-judicially
145 
that if the plaintiffs in Ivory had been able to prove that they had reasonably 
thought they were dealing with Mr Ivory personally, the result in the case 
would probably have been different. However, the Trevor Ivory decision is not 
expressed in those terms. It is expressed as a rationalisation of two competing 
common law principles (limited liability versus responsibility for one's 
negligence) in favour of limited liability where the wrongful action is 
negligence and the harm is "merely" property damage with consequent 
financial loss. The decision would perhaps be easier to accept if it were more 
144 Admittedly, their Lordships cited Henderson as authority for this proposition , which was decided 
three years after the case in Ivory. However, Cooke P's elevation of certain harms is nevertheless 
confusing as discussed below. 
14
' As mentioned above, n 116. 
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clearly stated as resting on its particular facts (and if the authorities of 
Centrepac, and Morton had been more fully addressed). 
If the facts of Trevor Ivory had fallen for consideration by the House of Lords, 
it seems feasible that their Lordships have found on those facts that the volume 
of personal dealings, coupled with the Andersons' seeking of Mr Ivory's 
services personally, would have been sufficient to impose on Mr Ivory a 
personal duty to take care. To the extent that this seems likely, is it not odd 
that the House of Lords, given their status in the "commercial centre" of the 
world, seem to place a much lower premium on the concept of limited liability 
than does Lord Cooke? Is it not similarly odd that Lord Cooke should place a 
lower premium on holding Mr Ivory responsible for causing the Andersons' 
loss, given earlier decisions of his in which he might be viewed, for example, 
as a champion of a contra preferentim doctrine? 
This paper considers that a finding of personal liability on the part of Mr Ivory 
would have been the correct result. 
C Evaluation 
Why did the New Zealand Court of Appeal find that Mr Ivory did not owe a 
personal duty of care in the circumstances? Cynics might argue along the 
following lines: 146 
... the question [in another case was]. .. the extent to which the Court was 
influenced by style rather than content. That takes us to questions about the 
limits of advocacy, questions also raised by Trevor Ivory ... where the 
presence of the defendant [Mr Ivory] at the back of the courtroom in a 
shabby tweed coat could have focused the minds of the New Zealand Court 
of Appeal. 
146 David Wishart "From Our Australian Correspondent" [ 1996] Company and Securities Law Bulletin 
71 , 73 (footnote omitted). 
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However, a better way of explaining the difference between the Trevor Ivory 
and Williams might simply be that different choices were made about the 
significance of tort law. The New Zealand Court of Appeal simply seemed 
"bewitched" by the company law case of Salomon. Their Lordships simply 
performed a standard tort duty analysis. Were the Court of Appeal correct in 
placing such importance on company law? 
i. Company law principles 
The thesis of this paper is that the Court of Appeal were not correct in placing 
such emphasis on company law, and particularly the case of Salomon. If the 
facts of Salomon had come before Lord Cooke himself it seems fair to say he 
might have decided the case differently utilising a purposive approach. The 
legislature of Mr Salomon's time never intended one-person companies to 
have the privilege of limited liability. The contribution to society of large 
railway-building companies cannot simply be extrapolated to one-person 
compames. Whether limited liability for one-person compames 1s 
appropriately needs to be separately justified. Large companies and one-person 
companies are different "things". Arguments in respect of one do not 
necessarily apply equally to the other. 
Further, the case of Salomon limited personal shareholder liability with respect 
to unsecured trade creditors of the company. The case is not authority for the 
principle that a director should be absolved from liability for negligence. Tort 
debts were never considered in the case of Salomon. The foundation cases of 
Donoghue v Stevenson 147 and Hedley Byrne were decided many years after 
Salomon and the debate about concurrent liability in contract and tort was only 
recently settled in Henderson. 
147 Donoghue v Stevenson [ 1932] AC 562 (HL). 
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Salomon is no authority for the proposition that a director's liability should be 
limited. If a director happens also to be a shareholder that does not alter the 
fact that the person acted as a director, not as a shareholder. It is not 
appropriate to extend to directors the principles of separate identity and limited 
liability, which were never intended to apply to one-person companies, simply 
because in a one-person company they happen to be the same person (by 
definition). On the contrary, this factor arguably underlines the difficulty with, 
and the inappropriateness of, the availability of the privilege of limited 
liability for one-person companies. They are a historical accident and an 
inappropriate use of the corporate form. They certainly should not be used as a 
basis for extending the already-significant privilege of limited liability for 
trade debts. 
One commentator has put it as follows: 148 
At the outset it is worth observing that the policy of having limited liability 
for corporate torts seems not to have ever been subjected to any significant 
degree of legislative or judicial scrutiny. When the principle was first 
introduced in l 855, the preceding debate had been about limited liability and 
voluntary creditors. Similarly, in the Salomon case in l 897 which affirmed 
the choice made by the legislature to have limited liability, there was 
considerable discussion of the wisdom and fairness of the policy as applied 
to trade and financial creditors but no mention of tort creditors. The courts 
seem lo have drifted towards the assumption that limited liability applied 
also 10 loris. It is not difficult to see why the special challenges posed by tort 
creditors were not also carefully considered; at that time tortious remedies 
were relatively undeveloped. Salomon was decided 35 years before 
Donoghue v Stevenson. Even in developed law it is difficult to find examples 
of situations where companies have been put into insolvent liquidation as a 
result of a tort claim. Probably companies usually have sufficient assets to 
meet tort claims either from their own assets of from insurance. 
Nevertheless, the lack of examples may be deceptive because if a company is 
on the edge of insolvency a tort claimant might not go to the bother and 
expense of suing it 
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The commentator continues by saying: 149 
The tort victim is not in a position to contract for a compensating benefit or 
to avoid or monitor the risk to which the company is exposing him. On this 
kind of basis, many ... scholars ... have concluded that the basic theoretical 
arguments do not adequately support the policy of having limited liability for 
tortious debts .... They emphasise that in certain circumstances limited 
liabi lity encourages overinvestment in hazardous industries, for since costs 
are externalised a corporation engaged in highly risky activities can be an 
attractive investment for its shareholder and yet its net value to society as a 
whole is negative; to put it simply, the company' s tort victim 's are 
subsidising it. 
Fundamental adherence to Salomon on the facts of lvo,y is highly 
challengeable. However, this paper considers that the fundamental adherence 
to Salomon is not the only difficulty with Ivory case. The decision is also 
challengeable on several other grounds. 
2. Duty analysis 
The starting point150 in any case in New Zealand where the existence of a duty 
of care is disputed is considered to be South Pacific, 151 which was decided by 
the Court of Appeal only a few months' prior to the decision in Ivory. Their 
Honours make only passing references to the decision in Ivory and base the 
decision on an assumption that, in this context, company law is more 
important. 
However, that assumption is clearly challengeable. Further, the tort analysis 
prescribed in South Pacific specifically incorporates a list of factors in 
determining whether a duty exists. The Court of Appeal specifically 
148 Pettet, 152 (footnotes omitted). 
14
q Pettet above n 13 , 153 (footnotes omitted). 
1
'
0 Todd above n 7, vii. 
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considered that whether an incremental approach or an Anns152 two-stage 
approach is adopted for determining whether a duty of care exists makes no 
fundamental difference so long as all the considerations are weighed. If 
company law really did have primacy on the facts of a particular case, the 
standard tort analysis would arguably "flush that out" in its consideration of all 
the factors at issue. 
How might the Ivory case have been decided had a South Pacific approach 
been taken? The issue in South Pacific was whether an investigator, under 
contract with an insurance company, owed a duty to take care in statement to 
the insured plaintiff when reporting on the cause of a fire. In other words, it 
presented a similar tripartite structure to the Ivory fact situation. Factors which 
the Court of Appeal addressed in determining the existence or otherwise of the 
duty of care included the following. 
(a) the degree of proximity between the parties 
The relationship between the Andersons and the company, Trevor Ivory Ltd 
was sufficiently close and direct to warrant imposing a duty of care, partly 
illustrated by the contract between them. Does this contract preclude the 
existence of a duty of care between the Andersons and Mr Ivory himself? 
Proximity is a difficult concept. In Henderson, it was held that the mere 
existence of a contract did not preclude liability in tort. In South Pacific, it was 
held that the existence of a contract between two of the parties did not 
preclude a duty of care owed by the third party to the plaintiffs. Richardson J 
held 153 in that case that where a contract covered a relationship, that contract 
should ordinarily cover the allocation of risk unless special reasons are 
established to warrant a duty of care in tort. Their Lordships in Henderson on 
the other hand, considered that tort law was the general law out of which the 
1
'
1 South Pacific above n 51. 
"" A nns v Merton London Borough Council [ 1978] AC 728 (H L). 
151 South Pacific above n 51 , 308 per Richardson J. 
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parties could contract: "Courts should not impose tort obligations inconsistent 
with the contractual agreement between the parties as parties always remained 
free to exclude tort". 154 
An issue arises of what effect the contract between the Andersons and the 
company should have on the existence or otherwise of a tort duty on the part 
of Mr Ivory personally. The argument that the imposition of a personal duty 
amounts to the "use of tort to supplement a contractual bargain" does not hold 
when the bargain the parties really made is considered. It will be necessary to 
return to this point. However, that factor aside, it seems clear that the 
relationship between the Andersons and Mr Ivory was sufficiently proximate 
to warrant a duty of care. The Andersons looked to Mr Ivory personally in the 
context of a long-term consultancy relationship. Advice businesses are 
personal by definition. Proximity would indicate a personal duty of care. 
Further, the fact of this proximity would mitigate any floodgates concerns. It is 
clearly defined who the victims might be. 
(b) the plaintiffs moral claim to compensation for avoidable harm 
An advantage of a more traditional tort analysis is that it allows a more 
thorough balancing of the competing interests at stake. Arguably, the Court of 
Appeal in Ivory subordinated the plaintiffs ' moral claim to compensation for 
avoidable harm 155 to a deference to the Salomon case. The tort analysis allows 
a more specific consideration of the merits of such a claim. It was held in 
South Pacific that such a claim increases where there are no obvious means by 
which plaintiffs may have protected themselves from the risk of carelessness 
on the defendant's part. 156 Mr Ivory had the knowledge of the potential havoc 
his sprays could wreak. There was no reason to suppose the Andersons had the 
"" Henderson v Merrill Syndicates Ltd [ 1995] 2 AC 145. 
"
1 South Pacific above n 51 , 306. 
116 South Pacific above n 51 , 307. 
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same knowledge given the extent to which they were willing to pay Mr Ivory 
for the knowledge that was at his disposal. Mr Ivory was in a better position to 
monitor the consequences of his negligence. All he has to do was take 
reasonable care. The Andersons ' business was no doubt as important to them 
as Mr Ivory ' s was to him. It is difficult to see what the plaintiffs in the case 
could have done to protect themselves. It seems reasonable that they should 
have carried out Mr Ivory ' s advice to the Jetter. Whether they should have 
contracted more specifically on the issue of liability is arguably not a 
diminishing factor because on an evaluation of moral claims, Mr Ivory should 
morally have brought this issue, and the risks, more fully to their attention. 
The plaintiffs in the ivory case arguably have a strong moral claim to 
compensation. 
Importantly, any extent to which there was room for criticism of the 
Andersons could be taken into account in the award of damages rather than 
denying the existence of a duty of care altogether. 
Against this should be balanced the defendant ' s moral claim to be protected 
from an undue burden of legal responsibility. 157 For example, would the duty 
expose the defendant to a burden out of proportion to his moral culpability?158 
A duty to take reasonable care imposed on Mr Ivory would be no more 
onerous than the equivalent duty that is placed on every other citizen. Business 
can be conducted perfectly acceptably without negligence. Arguably, the 
imposition of liability here would create incentives to take care and thereby 
assist in the maintenance of professional standards generally. Given the 
dubious applicability of Salomon to one-person companies and to tort 
creditors generally, it is difficult to see that imposing personal liability here 
would be out of proportion to Mr Ivory 's moral culpability. This factor weighs 
in the Andersons ' favour. 
157 Sowh Pacific above n 51 , 306. 
1
'
8 South Pacific above n 51 , 307. 
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( c) the integrity of other legal principles 
Under this head, the significance of the existence of the corporate form could 
be specifically considered. Whether the availability of limited liability for one-
person companies, and for tort creditors of companies generally, is indeed 
appropriate could be addressed fully. This must be preferable to an underlying, 
arguably unevaluated assumption that Salomon must be upheld, almost at all 
costs. This analysis could make apparent that a finding of liability on the facts 
of Trevor Ivory would not undermine the value of the corporate form. The 
legion of other instances in which the corporate veil has been lifted might be 
examples of that. A finding of liability would arguably move the corporate 
form closer to how it was originally intended to operate, and closer to what the 
privilege of limited liability was originally granted in order to achieve. It was 
certainly never intended to act as an incentive for directors not to take care. A 
finding of liability on the part of Mr Ivory would arguably bring a more 
appropriate and defensible balance between the competing interests and 
businesses at stake. 
( d) the harm itself 
Some analysis of whether the harm caused was economic loss is appropriate 
under this heading, however, this point is considered later. 
The degree and magnitude of the risk of harm are also appropriately 
considered under this head. These factors must favour the existence of a duty 
given the intrinsically risky nature of the spray business, and the extent to 
which negligent application of or advice to apply spray could foreseeably (and 
did) cause harm to the plaintiffs. 
(e) the impact of any relevant statutes 
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The analogy of a statute may "properly influence the development of the 
common law", for example by encouraging the court to hold that certain 
interests warrant protection. 159 It is significant that the Companies Act 1993 
has specifically increased the exposure of directors to personal liability 160 
reflecting a clear policy initiative to hold directors more accountable for their 
actions. The Fair Trading Act 1986 and the Consumer Guarantees Act 1993 
reflect a similar policy of the importance of the maintenance of standards in 
business contexts. These factors would indicate a duty. 
(f) any assumption of responsibility 
The question of whether the defendant assumed any responsibility towards the 
plaintiff would be appropriately considered in its original form, that is to the 
significantly lower threshold originally postulated by Hedley Byrne (even as 
modified by Henderson). There would be no apparent need to raise the 
threshold of the test in deference to the corporate form as the existence of the 
company would be separately considered. Importantly, the tort analysis 
emphasises that the existence of the company is only one factor out of a range 
of factors which must be considered in the duty analysis. 
The personal nature of the relationship, and the fact that the Andersons were 
reasonably looking to Mr Ivory personally, on the facts , clearly indicates a 
personal assumption of responsibility in this case when the original threshold 
is applied. 
In addition, the imbalance of knowledge in the lvo,y case, the corresponding 
reliance and dependence of the plaintiffs on the advice of Mr Ivory and Mr 
Ivory ' s awareness of those factors also indicate a duty . When a person seeks 
an advisor ' s advice they are suspending their own responsibility. That's the 
point. This is underlined by analogy with the solicitor and debenture holder 
"
9 South Pacific above n 51, 298 per Cooke P. 
160 See for example slJS Companies Act 1993, discussed further below. 
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cases mentioned in South Pacific and the "high degree of likelihood that 
careless performance of that responsibility will cause harm to the plaintiff." 161 
However, a further issue arises as to whether, on a Hedley Byrne analysis, the 
company might be viewed as a "reasonable disclaimer" of liability. 162 This 
issue is almost the corollary of the assumption of responsibility question; 
assumption of responsibility and disclaimer of liability appear to be almost 
two sides of the same coin. Clearly, the disclaimer issue must be addressed on 
the facts, as it was in Hedley Byrne; the mere existence of a company indicates 
nothing on its own outside of an analysis of the context in which it was 
perceived and treated by the parties. 
Again, on the facts, the company cannot have been a reasonable disclaimer of 
liability in this case; neither party had thought about what was the perception 
of the other with respect to liability. A reasonable disclaimer must surely be 
clearer than that. It would also be appropriate to consider contra pref erentim 
principles. Arguably, a party seeking the privilege of limited liability should 
bear the onus of proving that limited liability was the genuinely-contracted 
bargain. 
Even if it were considered that, on the facts, the company did weigh towards a 
duty of care, again this would be only one factor to be weighed in the ultimate 
balancing exercise. The fact that it was at best a very weak and unclear 
disclaimer of liability, as evidenced by the fact that it had clearly not 
disclaimed liability in the minds of the Andersons, would be necessarily taken 
into account. 
(g) the availability of other remedies 
1
~
1 South Pacific above n 51, 308. 
16
~ See Todd above n 7,528 for a criticism of the Court of Appeal ' s judgement on this point: "does the 
company amount to a sufficient disclaimer of liability or not?" 
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Having reached a finding that the Andersons were morally entitled to 
compensation for their loss, the tort analysis specifically allows consideration 
of the fact that there were no other effective remedies available to the 
Andersons. The company would have had no money to meet the claims 
against it. 
Richardson J found no duty on this point m South Pacific because any 
inadequacy of an insurance remedy would simply have been because the 
plaintiffs had "only paid a premium which gave them that lesser protection." 
His Honour considered that contractual remedies were an appropriate sanction 
against want of care in that case and he could not see any justification for 
allowing a "greater recovery in tort than [the plaintiffs] were prepared to pay 
for in contract". 163 However, in the Ivory case, the existence of the company 
had a distortionary effect on the allocation of risk, inhibiting that risk from 
being appropriately taken into account. The Andersons were not seeking to 
supplement their contractual bargain by bringing the tort action, but were 
instead simply seeking to enforce the bargain they reasonably thought they 
had. Arguably, the risk was not factored into the fee due to the distortionary 
effect of Mr Ivory ' s company, the lack of awareness of the significance of that 
on the part of the plaintiffs ' and the lack of any incentive on Mr Ivory ' s part to 
draw that significance to their attention. Contractual remedies would not be an 
effective sanction at all in Ivory. A personal duty on the part of Mr Ivory is 
further indicated. 
(h) general economic considerations 
Also pointing towards a duty are general economic considerations, generally 
summarised by asking "which is the best party to bear this loss"? It has been 
argued that the Andersons are better placed to bear the loss because they are 
better placed to obtain insurance for their crop. They know how much the crop 
is worth and can therefore obtain insurance of an appropriate value. Mr Ivory, 
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it is argued, is unlikely to be able to obtain insurance so the Joss is more 
appropriately borne by the victims of his negligence. If he were able to obtain 
insurance, a situation of double insurance should be avoided as this would be 
"inefficient". 
However, is it correct to say that the Andersons could insure against this loss? 
Mr Ivory's negligent advice might be seen by an insurance company as 
foreseeable and falling outside the standard category, for insurance in this area, 
of "fortuitous, unforeseen consequence". The Andersons might not be able to 
obtain insurance for this paiiicular type of loss. Mr Ivory on the other hand has 
the possibility of obtaining professional indemnity cover, (and then factoring 
the cost of this into his fee). Arguably, Mr Ivory is in the best position to 
monitor his tort risk; Mr Ivory has the knowledge-advai1tage of knowing what 
the sprays are capable of, and the risk that they entail. The Andersons paid for 
Mr Ivory's advice precisely because they did not have this knowledge. 
Spraying is not always of noxious substances. Fertilisers and acidity regulators 
such as calcium and lime are common sprays; spraying may occur several 
times daily over many years and many orchards without incident. The 
Andersons surely cannot be taken to have reasonably suspected that their 
entire orchard was at stake when they asked for Mr Ivory 's spray advice. 
The cost of the insurance premium to Mr Ivory will depend on factors such as 
experience and previous claims. If insurance turns out to be prohibitively 
expensive for Mr Ivory that is a clear market indication that the business 
should not be undertaken. Alternatively, it would force him to specifically 
contract on the issue of liability in each case. Undoubtedly, the Andersons 
would not have gone ahead on the same terms if they were fully aware of the 
risk. There is an issue of informed consent in this context: the person who has 
the knowledge should have an onus to communicate that knowledge to enable 
a fully-informed decision by the potential victim. If people in Mr Ivory 's 
position have automatic limited liability removed, cannot get insurance, and 
ic,i So uth Pacific above n 51, 308. 
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cannot get clients to voluntarily and expressly agree to accept the risk of the 
loss, they always have the further option of simply taking more care in the first 
place. Arguably, a legal regime which encourages this would be more 
efficient. 
A micro level economic analysis arguably indicates the existence of a duty. (It 
will be necessary to attempt later a more macro-level economic analysis 
concerning the justification for the existence of limited liability generally). 
Ultimately, the question 111 South Pacific is whether a duty is "just and 
reasonable" in all the circumstances. 164 From the preceding analysis it seems 
clear that that should have been the case. The fact that a South Pacific 
approach to the case was not undertaken has been criticised. One commentator 
put the situation as follows: 165 
The court appears to have held that there is a presumption that by choosing 
to make a contract with a limited liability company the plaintiff accepts that 
any personal liability on the pait of the director. .. is excluded: Cooke P spoke 
of the need for "special circumstances" to justify personal liability .... Thus it 
is up to the plaintiff to establish that personal liability was intended, not for 
the defendant to establish that it was not. This approach is hard to reconcile 
with normal principles of negligence liability ... one should start with the 
liable human and move from there to the liable company, not vice versa. 
In this respect the approach of the Court of Appeal can be seen as a significant 
departure from authority, which departure can arguably only be explained by a 
questionable deference to the principle of Salomon. 
3. identification 
164 South Pacific above n 51 , 306 per Richardson J. 
161 Todd above n 7, 372. 
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As a matter of theory, the doctrine of identification is proposed in Trevor Ivory 
as a justification for the virtual presumption that a director does not assume 
personal liability. 166 
However, it not clear why identification should create a "magic cloak" that 
renders a human agent "invisible" or non-existent. How can a human agent 
cease to act as him or herself while acting "as" the company. Surely one and 
one should make two? 
The invocation of the principle of identification in the Trevor Ivory case has 
been described as being "demonstrably in error" 167 and a misapplication of the 
case of Tesco: 168 
... the use of the doctrine of identification is one point at which the reasoning 
of the Court of Appeal is not reliable. The doctrine of identification is a 
fiction for establishing the state of mind of a company. It is far-fetched to 
imagine that it is a consideration in the assumption by a director of personal 
responsibility . 
The recent Privy Council case of Meridian 169 displaces the doctrine of 
identification with principles of "attribution", a concept which more clearly 
encapsulates the essence of Tesco. The essence of the difference between the 
two concepts might be described as follows. Basically, identification makes 
the company and the director "one" in order to determine whether liability 
can be sheeted home to a company at all. However, it does not make them 
"one" in the sense that it precludes or somehow erases the separate liability of 
the human agent for what will effectively be the same act. Attribution 
encapsulates this better, because it more clearly extracts just what is necessary 
166 " Developments in New Zealand" above n 75, I 05. 
167 PG Watts "Company Law" [ I 995] Recent LR 237, 237. 
168 " Developments in New Zealand" above n 75, 106 (footnote omitted). 
169 Meridian Global Funds Management Asia Ltd v The Securities Commission ( I 995) 3 WLR 413 
(PC) [Meridian]. 
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from the already-tortious act of the human agent in order to determine if the 
company is additionally liable. 
It has been suggested that the rejection of the identification doctrine in 
Meridian renders untenable the principle that a director is identifiable "as" the 
company and therefore not liable for tortious acts unless the director assumes 
personal responsibility. In other words, in any future consideration of a 
Trevor Ivory fact situation: 170 
... it will not be possible for the courts to say that a director is identified with 
the company ... and therefore ... cannot be liable to a third party. Instead, the 
liability of the company should be considered discreetly [sic] from the 
liability of the director. In determining the liability of the company ... the 
Court would easily decide ... that for that purpose, the act of Trevor Ivory 
was the act of the company. But it would not follow that Trevor Ivory was 
identified with the company to the extent that clear evidence would be 
needed to displace that notion .... Instead his liability would be determined as 
a separate issue. 
This is precisely the result indicated from a traditional tort analysis. The issue 
in Ivory should have been whether the director 's own acts satisfied the 
requirements of a legal wrong. 171 Built as it is upon the foundations of Tesco, 
"the reasoning in Trevor Ivory can be no longer considered as the means for 
determining the tortious liability of a director to a third party". 172 
-I. The "elevated harms " of personal and property damage 
170 Susan Watson "A nthropomorphism Reined In?: The Effects of the Meridian Decision on the 
Tortious Liability of Directors to Third Parties" [ I 997] Company and Securities Law Bulletin 149, 154 
["Anthropomorphism"]. 
171 Neil Campbell " Directors ' Liability to Third Parties" [1998] Company and Securities Law Bulletin 
34, 35. 
172 " Anthropomorphism" above n 170, 154. However, for a contrasting view, see Grantham above n 
50, 261 who considers that attribution would work in the same way as the Court of Appeal considered 
identification did in lvo,y. 
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Another difficulty with the reasoning of the Court of Appeal in Ivory is the 
significance given to the type of harm that was caused. The damage in the 
Ivory case, property damage with consequent financial loss, had been 
negligently caused and therefore fell outside the articulated "safe harbour": 
personal injury or intentionally-caused property damage. That these two harms 
are "elevated" is confusing for two broad reasons. 
Firstly, why was pure economic loss that was nevertheless intentionally caused 
not similarly elevated? Commonwealth jurisprudence contains many examples 
of cases where courts have considered it appropriate to "pierce the veil" and 
find personal liability on the part of a director where, for example, fraud or 
conversion was involved. Cooke P himself has mentioned, extra-judicially, 
that the only broad class of veil-piercing cases which is truly consistent with 
the Salomon reasoning are cases where: 173 
... under enactments such as those against fraudulent or wrongful trading, or 
on the permissible interpretation of an enactment of contract, or for the 
purposes of common law or equitable principles against fraud or oppression 
or relating to agency, it is necessary to look at what happened in fact rather 
than in form. 
Of course, torts such as fraud or conversion generally cause monetary losses, 
or damage of a "pure economic loss" character. To have included these would 
have highlighted the incongruity of the exclusion of the harm caused in the 
Ivory case. Nevertheless, they should not have been excluded from the 
analysis. 
Secondly, the exclusion of the damage caused 111 the Ivory case 1s cunous 
itself. 
I assume that the basis for elevating the harms of personal injury and 
intentionally-caused physical damage in Ivory stems from the historical 
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development of the common law of tort. A primary concern of that law has 
traditionally been the safeguarding of bodily integrity, 174 with the safeguarding 
of property coming a close second. In articulating that the "kind of harm" is a 
factor to be taken into account in determining the existence of a duty, Cooke P 
in South Pacific separated out personal injury on the grounds that "the first 
concern of the law is naturally personal safety. Or at least most people would, 
I think, say so" .175 All other damage, including physical damage to property or 
financial loss, however, was characterised as "economic loss". 176 
Negligence cases involving financial loss have traditionally been controversial 
due to floodgates concerns. However, financial loss which is consequent on 
damage to land or property is generally "recoverable without especial 
difficulty". 177 What real difference is there for example between personal 
injury negligently caused and property damage negligently caused (bearing in 
mind the effect on personal injury claims in New Zealand of the Accident 
Compensation legislation)? New Zealand courts would not normally relegate 
the damage caused in Ivory. What difference does it really make? The property 
damage and consequent financial loss in Ivory occurred as a result of a tort that 
fell short of intention, but on any analysis must have been devastating to the 
Andersons. Small, agricultural businesses such as the Andersons ' are 
important to the New Zealand economy. Protection of them for both the 
people involved and for the economy as a whole should not be subordinated to 
traditional categorisations without examination. Society develops, and we may 
have reached a point where the traditional elevations are less justifiable today 
than they were during their heyday in the 1911, century. 
173 Turning Points above n 28, 13. 
174 Todd, above n 7, 9. I use "bodily integrity" for the purpose of discuss ion , aware that civil actions for 
personal injury by accident are now generally barred in New Zealand by the Accident Rehabilitation 
and Compensation Insurance Act 1992. 
m South Pacific above n 51, 296. 
176 South Pacific above n 51 , 296 
177 Todd above n 7, 11. 
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One commentator has put it as follows: 178 
It might be argued ... that direct personal responsibility is more acceptable 
where the director has indulged in conduct that amounts to a tort such as 
fraud or conversion (with its clear indications of deliberate wrongdoing by 
the director. .. ) but is less acceptable where what might be described as 
"mere" negligence is involved. In the latter instance, the conduct of the 
director, wrongful though it is, is possibly less reprehensible and less 
deserving of leading to his personal liability for what was the wrongdoing of 
the company. I fail to see why the modern law of to11s should make any 
distinction between what might be called degrees of wrongdoing. That might 
be reasonable were criminal liability in question. I do not see that it is where 
compensation, not punishment, is the issue. 
Arguably, the non-articulation of the precise reasons for elevating only these 
harms undermines the integrity of other reasoning in the judgement. For 
example, if the object of incorporation would be undermined by imposing 
personal liability in the Trevor Ivory situation, 179 why would that not also be 
the case when one of the elevated harms arises? Another commentator has 
stated that: 180 
To decide that there are any circumstances in which shareholders can be held 
liable for tort damages even though the formalities of the corporate form 
have been observed is to discard limited liability in principle ... as soon as one 
has recognised that shareholders can be personally liable for corporate torts 
in principle, one is logica lly driven to employ general principles of tort 
law ... to determine the scope of their potential liability. 
The judgement of the Court of Appeal in Ivory was influenced by the 
fundamental importance their Honours placed on company law. It seems fair to 
say that Cooke P resiled from that strict position slightly, perhaps in the 
interests of justice, by articulating the elevated harms: in circumstances where 
178 Fridman above n 7, 57 . 
179 Trevor Ivory above n 5, 524, line 27. 
180 I lansmaan above n 12 , I 932 . 
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these types of harm are caused, company law should not take the same 
primacy. However, if that initial standpoint had not been taken, and a 
traditional tort analysis had been undertaken instead, this would not have been 
necessary, and the arguable confusion caused by the elevation of certain harms 
only would not have been created. 
5. Morton v Douglas Homes 
In the case of Morton, a building company wanted to build a block of flats on 
top of an old shingle pit which had been covered with sawdust and spoil. The 
Council required the company to report on the flats' proposed foundations. 
The company instructed an engineer to prepare the necessary report but failed 
to implement its stipulated requirements. The company also laid heavy 
concrete structures on the ground against the report's advice. Many of the 
ultimate purchasers of the flats were elderly; when the flats suffered damage 
due to the subsidence of the foundations, they sued for the cost of repairs and 
for diminution in value of their properties. The company and the directors 
personally were held liable in negligence for having caused this economic 
loss. 
The Court of Appeal's decision in ivory is also confusing because of the 
handling of the case of Morton. Why were the directors personally liable in 
Morton but not in ivory? If Morton was wrongly decided, why did the Court of 
Appeal not explicitly overrule it? 
The negligence in the Morton case concerned omissions (negligently failing to 
ensure the engineer's recommendations were carried out). The negligence in 
ivory concerned a statement. However, negligence for both types of "act" is 
sufficiently well-established that the distinction between the cases cannot be 
founded on this basis. 
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Cooke P stated that on the particular facts there was an assumption of 
responsibility in Morton but not in Ivory. 181 Why is this the case when the 
directors in Morton also acted through a company? 
The company in Morton was perhaps less "one-person" than Mr Ivory's 
company; it employed a staff-member (Mr McMillan) and had all its 
construction work carried out by gangs of labour-only builders, 182 causing it 
perhaps to have more substance independently of the directors themselves. 
However, arguably this would have presented less of a case for personal 
liability. In addition, there was a significant lack of personal dealings with the 
plaintiffs in comparison with the Ivory case. If there was an "assumption of 
responsibility" in Morton there certainly should have also been one in Ivory 
Can the rationalisation be that there is a "building exception" in the area of 
personal director liability in New Zealand? Cooke P does not indicate so in his 
judgement: 183 
Clearly the judgement [in Morton] was not intended to lay down a general 
rule in building negligence cases and it would be unsafe to try to argue from 
one particular set of facts to another. 
However, one commentator has argued that this must nevertheless be the 
case: 184 
The decision [in Morton] can be justified, if at all , on the grounds that under 
New Zealand law there is an obligation imposed on every person concerned 
with the construction of a house to ensure that the house is properly 
constructed, which is not based on an assumption of responsibility ... This 
would be an odd duty, which does not attach to other goods or products: but 
there is considerable judicial support for its existence, and it enables us to 
make sense of Morton. 
181 Trevor Ivo,y above n 5, 523 
182 Morton above n 128, 555. 
183 Trevor Ivory above n 5, 523. 
184 "Corporate Personality" above n 29, 37. 
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Arguably this would be in line with New Zealand's statutory context which 
(now) includes the clear consumer protection focus of the Consumer 
Guarantees Act and the Fair Trading Act. It might simply be the case that, in 
policy terms, homeowners in New Zealand should be protected from the 
consequences of negligent builders. This would reflect the importance to the 
New Zealand psyche of owning one's own home and the fact that purchasers 
of homes cannot be expected to have inspected the builders' work. 185 It also 
might reflect a reality of the building industry in New Zealand whereby it has 
been common for builders to conduct trade through complicated corporate 
structures in order to shield themselves from personal liability. A finding of 
personal director liability might reflect society's disapprobation of such 
conduct. 186 
If it was reasonable to differentiate on this basis, however, why did the Court 
of Appeal not say so? It might have been arguable that any such "building 
exception" protects consumers, not business-people and arguably the 
Andersons were not "consumers" in the sense intended by the legislation. 
Further, the Andersons might have been argued to have been in a better 
position to protect themselves against the consequences of Mr Ivory's 
negligence than were the house-purchasers in Morton. 
However, this position might be controvertible. One could argue that the 
Andersons were not in a position that was so markedly different from a house 
purchaser. They were at a knowledge disadvantage and a position of reliance, 
18 ' For other arguments in favour of a building exception , see Sir Robin Cooke "An Impossible 
Distinction" ( 1991) l 07 Law Quarterly Review 46, 62-67 . 
186 Indeed Lord Cooke notes, in Turning Points above n 28, 12 that the "avoidance or evasion ... of local 
taxation regimes or legislative controls must be indeed among the primary reasons for the international 
proliferation of companies". The plaintiffs in Ivory argued that Mr Ivory's company was purely a "tax 
device". Jn 1985, when the negligent act actually occurred in that case, the top personal tax rate was 
66%, compared with a company tax rate of 45%. The use of companies to split income and thereby 
reduce tax was widespread. It is also questionable whether the law should permit the privilege of the 
limited liability company to be used in such ways. 
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and there does not seem to be such a difference between a consumer and a 
small business person that such a difference in result is warranted. Arguably, 
the New Zealand psyche values small businesses in a similar manner to the 
way it values homes; if there should be a special rule to protect homes, 
therefore, it would be arguably appropriately applicable to small businesses 
also. The Andersons' small business must certainly have been as important to 
them as was their home, and possibly even a larger investment. All the reasons 
for allowing a building exception might apply to a small business exception as 
well. 
In fact there may even be a stronger argument if the Andersons are really 
considered not to be "consumers". Consumers harmed by a company's 
negligent misstatement receive protection under the Consumer Guarantees 
Act. If people in the position of the Andersons are to be denied both legislative 
protection, because they are not consumers, and also protection under tort law, 
there is arguably a gap in the law that is contrary to the general legislative 
scheme. This would arguably indicate that a small business exception is 
appropriate as well. 
On the other hand, a small-business exception might be argued to be less 
defensible because it would affect a smaller class of people. However, it would 
still affect a significant class, given the amount of small business that is 
conducted in New Zealand. 
The difficulty with the ivory case is that if it was reasonable to differentiate 
between the cases on the basis of a "building exception", why did their 
Honours not say so? Why did their Honours not simply say that New Zealand 
law acknowledges these other duties with respect to homes that it does not 
acknowledge with respect to small businesses? Their Honours seemed 
concerned not to overrule the Morton decision. However, its direct 




The decision in Ivory arguably creates the wrong incentives. It amounts to an 
immunity from the requirement to take reasonable care. 187 The Court of 
Appeal were concerned that commercial enterprise and endeavour should not 
be discouraged by subjecting directors to such "onerous potential liabilities". 
However, why would that be the case if liability were imposed in Ivory? Aside 
from the difficulties with the application of this argument to one-person 
companies generally, limited liability might be argued to be an incentive to 
assume too much risk 188 Entrepreneurial activity can flourish quite adequately 
without limited liability.189 If limited liability is desirable, then parties will 
contract for it specifically (as they did before 1855). If no creditor will conduct 
business in a particular case on those terms, then the argument that the mere 
existence of a company has made it "clear" that limited liability for negligence 
was impliedly contracted for, breaks down. Why should the mere existence of 
a company remove the requirement for a person to take reasonable care? All 
Mr Ivory had to do was take reasonable care. How "onerous" can that be, 
especially when the consequences for the Andersons are weighed in the 
equation? How desirable is a legal rule which encourages company directors 
as a class not to take reasonable care - to "overinvest in risky activities and 
underinvest in safety"? 190 The law should encourage the desire to create proper 
investment and safety incentives. 191 Limited liability is a privilege. We should 
not allow the interposition of a company, an admitted metaphor, to prevent a 
judgement that is otherwise required. 192 
187 One could ask, if it had been Mr Ivory's own farm, would be have made the same mistake? 
188 Hansmaan above n I 2, 1894, I 904-6. 
189 Hansmaan above n 12, 1924. 
190 See Hansmaan above n 12 genera ll y. 
191 Leebron above n 16, 1581 . 
192 Nicholas James "Separate Legal Personality; Legal Reality and Metaphor" ( 1993) 5 Bond Law 
Review 217, 223. 
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It therefore seems valid to ask what, from a policy perspective, would we want 
the law in New Zealand in this area to be? 
It has been argued that irrespective of the merits of the decision in Ivory, the 
decision should stand because at least it is "certain". The utility of a statutory 
framework is measured in part by the "certainty which it brings to the 
calculation of transaction costs". 193 Once certainty is achieved, people will 
organise their affairs and the invisible hand of the market will lead to a final 
state of affairs that is "fair". 
However, the Ivory decision has not been certain in application: some judges 
have applied the decision and others have made every effort to distinguish it, 194 
thereby precluding certainty for a litigant. Exactly when a director will be held 
to have crossed the line and made a tort his or her own is unclear, 195 and some 
have argued that to find the director liable in Fairline and not in Ivory 
attributes a degree of legal sophistication to the parties which does not reflect 
commercial reality. 
Reform is therefore indicated. In fact, it seems odd that reform has not been 
called for earlier. The answer to this, however, must be that there is no 
organised body to argue for the reform. The largest contract creditors by class, 
banks, generally protect themselves through the use of personal director 
guarantees, thereby achieving effective unlimited liability in a limited liability 
regime. Directors of course as a class prefer the status qua ; limited liability 
arguably gives them "something for nothing". Why would they therefore argue 
for its abolition. Victims, particularly tort victims, are not organised as a class. 
193 Pollard "Fear and Loathing in the Boardroom: Directors Confront New Insolvent Trading 
Provisions" (1994) 22 ABLR 392, 396 cited in Thomas Telfer " Insolvency: Inroads into Corporate 
Personality in the Insolvency Context - Commentary" in Conference Papers - "A Centenary 
Celebration of Salomon" Conference [ I 997] , I 7. 
194 "Anthropomorphism" above n 170, I 52. 
195 Pettet above n 13, 137 n 67. 
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Nevertheless, reform is necessary. Some commentators have argued that the 
principle in Salomon is often "unthinkingly applied", a practice which creates 
"unexamined and unexpected consequences made meaningful only by 
reference to the original metaphor". 196 They argue that, instead, m every 
situation in which the separate legal entity concept is to be applied, one must 
"go back to basics" and ask what are the underlying economic purposes of 
limited liability, and to what extent do they require the doctrine to be applied 
here? 197 The concept of a company as a separate legal person, a metaphor of 
limited use like all legal fictions, can only be justified by and assessed to the 
extent that it services the law's social and economic ends. 198 It is essential that 
the interests of decision makers are brought more closely into line with 
societal interests in this area. 
There are two possible avenues of reform: one could reform the Jaw of 
companies, or one could reform the Jaw of tort. 199 Each is considered in turn. 
VI REFORM 
A Reform Company Law 
1. The "essential company concept" 
A discussion of company law reform might begin with what might be termed 
the "essential company concept". It can be seen that the original introduction 
of general limited liability was geared towards a certain type of company: it 
was one in which a large aggregation of wealth was necessary in order to 
196 James, Bond LR, 227. 
197 James, Bond LR, 227. 
198 Goddard 8. James, Bond LR 218 . 
199 A third possibility might be to raise the question of whether persons in the position of Mr Ivory 
might have owed an equitable duty of care to the Andersons. This might be something less than a 
fiduciary duty, but stemming from the imbalance of knowledge and the degree of trust and reliance 
that was present in the relationship. This possibility is not fully examined in this paper, but given that 
Trevor Ivory is high Court of Appeal authority, there may be value in considering the "resurgence of 
equity" as an argument in order to argue for justice in a pa11icular case. 
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undertake a project of physically large proportions, such as building a railway. 
Such a project was often risky, and limited liability was a necessary "carrot" in 
order to encourage wealthy investors to make their capital available for the 
"benefit of the nation", so to speak. The projects were necessary to develop 
and industrialise Britain. The carrot was attractive because it enabled the 
attainment of significant investment rewards with a significant limitation of 
the associated risk. No average entrepreneur had sufficient capital to undertake 
these projects without investment from other sources. The legislature could be 
said to have reflected this "accumulation of capital" aspect by requiring at 
least seven investors or shareholders before the privilege of incorporation (and 
limited liability) would be granted. 
The large accumulation of wealth that was a feature of these companies meant 
that the companies themselves had significant assets with which they might 
meet any claims. 
In addition, a key feature of these companies was the separation of ownership 
and control: shareholders were generally investors only who invested their 
money leaving somebody else to "do the work". Limited liability therefore 
removed the need for them to have to constantly monitor the activities of 
directors for fear of personal liability. 
For these reasons, the liability of investors 111 "essential" compa111es was 
limited to the amount invested. 
2. Efficiency arguments for limited liability 
The economic arguments in favour of limited liability are usually analysed in 
terms of the "essential company concept" and then extrapolated 
unquestioningly to small companies where there is no separation of ownership 
and control. What are the economic arguments in favour of limited liability, 
and do they apply equally to companies such as Mr Ivory ' s? 
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contractual creditors, otherwise known as trade creditors or 
"voluntary creditors"; 
tort creditors, such as a pedestrian unsuspectingly knocked 
down by a person driving a van in the course of a company ' s 
business. These are otherwise known as " involuntary 
creditors"·200 , 
tort creditors, such as the Andersons in the Trevor Ivory case, 
who were injured by the defendant ' s negligence in the course of 
carrying out a contract that the Andersons had with the 
defendant company. There is some debate over to whether such 
victims should be classified as voluntary or involuntary 
creditors. 
Efficiency arguments are usually analysed in terms of the first category: 
contract creditors, the type of creditors at issue in the Salomon case. 
(a) transaction costs 
It is argued that the corporate form reduces transaction costs. Prior to the 1855 
Act, companies were achieving limited liability by contracting on limited 
liability terms in each case. This required contracts between each trade creditor 
and each shareholder in each case. Obviously, in the case of a large company 
with even only a few shareholders this was time-consuming. The corporate 
form allowed a separate company to enter into one contract on behalf of all its 
shareholders, thereby reducing transaction costs. That is, it removed the need 
for each shareholder to contract with each trade creditor on the specific issue 
200 I use this example for ease of analysis, aware that ACC in New Zealand would more likely than not 
remove the ability for such a victim to sue in tort. 
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of limited liability. The trade creditors were taken to know that each 
shareholder's liability was limited simply by the use of the corporate form. In 
the case of a large company, the use of such a "standard contract" reduced 
transaction costs and was therefore "efficient". 
The corporate form also facilitates the transferability of assets, by making 
available the option of a transfer of shares rather than a transfer of the assets 
individually. However, limited liability is not necessary for this to occur. 
Further, it is more common for the individual assets to be specifically 
transferred anyway, as a transfer of shares may incorporate an associated 
transfer of hidden company debts. 
(b) shareholder monitoring costs 
A second efficiency argument for limited liability is that limited liability 
reduces shareholder monitoring costs. In a situation of unlimited liability, if 
each shareholder is jointly and severally liable for the debts of an organisation, 
any one shareholder' s individual liability in the event of company failure will 
be directly affected by the solvency of the other shareholders. For example, if 
one of the shareholders becomes bankrupt, that shareholder' s share of the 
burden will have to be picked up by the remaining shareholders. They will 
have to pay more than their proportionate share because the bankrupt 
shareholder will pay less than his or her proportionate share. As each 
individual shareholder' s risk exposure is therefore directly affected by the 
solvency of the other shareholders, shareholders acting "rationally" will 
monitor the wealth of their co-shareholders in order to monitor their own 
position. 
In a situation of general limited liability on the other hand , each shareholder' s 
exposure is "capped" at the amount unpaid on the shares. As their situation 
will therefore not be affected by the bankruptcy of a co-shareholder, the need 
to monitor the co-shareholders ' position is eliminated. Of course, if a situation 
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of pro rata rather than joint and several unlimited liability were adopted, this 
argument would fall down. In a situation of pro rata unlimited liability the 
total shortfall on failure of the company is allocated between all the 
shareholders in proportion to their shareholding. Their exposure is capped at 
this amount. If one of the other shareholders declares personal bankruptcy, 
their debt to the company's creditors is proved along with his or her other 
personal debts. If it is not met, it is not picked up by the other shareholders, 
and the total pool available to the company's creditors is simply reduced (as is 
customarily the case with limited liability). However, the efficiency argument 
for limited liability on the grounds that it reduces shareholder monitoring costs 
therefore falls down because the same reduction can be achieved under an 
unlimited liability situation if pro rata rather than joint unlimited liability is in 
place. 
( c) enforcement costs 
A third argument is that limited liability reduces enforcement costs.
20 1 In the 
event of the insolvency of a large publicly-listed corporation, a victim could 
potentially have to sue each individual shareholder in an unlimited liability 
situation. This would be time-consuming and maybe unfruitful , if, having 
located a shareholder, they were of insufficient means to meet the claim. 
Limited liability reduces this cost by limiting recourse to the company only. 
( d) other arguments 
In addition, limited liability facilitates the accumulation of capital for the 
purpose of undertaking large projects. As was seen in the debate preceding the 
Limited Liability Act 1855, such projects may have benefit for the economy 
and where they would be unlikely to be undertaken either by one person 
individually, or by accumulated investors in a situation of unlimited liability, a 
general limited liability regime is of benefit. 
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Trade creditors are argued to know that they are dealing with a limited liability 
company; they can therefore adjust their rates of credit accordingly. Further, 
the principals of companies want to continue receiving credit from such 
creditors, and in order not to upset them, will take their considerations into 
account in making decisions about the company. The costs of the creditors' 
risk are thereby internalised to the company with efficiency resulting. 
Finally, it is argued that limited liability places the risk of loss most efficiently 
on the person best able to bear that risk. Obviously, someone must bear the 
loss when a company collapses owing more than its assets. Limited liability 
shifts the burden of that loss onto the creditors of the company so that instead 
of the shareholders suffering a depletion of their personal assets, the creditors 
instead suffer that depletion. 202 It is argued that creditors bear this risk of loss 
more cheaply than do shareholders. Indeed, they were contracting on these 
terms before limited liability was brought in, reflecting the fact that the market 
found this to be more efficient. The legislation simply reflects that and makes 
it less costly by providing a "standard contract" . 
3. Evaluation with respect to tort creditors of one-person companies 
Arguably these arguments do not apply to companies that do not fall within 
the "essential company concept". Further, they arguably do not apply where 
the creditor is a tort victim as opposed to a business person who contracted 
with the company at arm ' s-length in the course of trade. This is particularly 
the case where a tort victim falls into the second category. Where there was no 
contract with the company, the tort creditor had no opportunity to bargain to 
have the risk to him or her taken into account. Efficiency is arguably precluded 
in such a situation. 
20 1 Hansmann above n 12, I 899. 
202 Pettet 146. 
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(a) transaction costs 
One-person compames by definition have only one shareholder. Therefore, 
contracting between each creditor and the shareholder on each business 
transaction is arguably no more onerous than contracting with the company. 
There is no reduction of transaction costs. One could argue that it removes the 
need for the shareholder to have to raise the issue of their desired limited 
liability. However, this factor is arguably what caused the problems in the 
Ivory case. If the parties in the case had contracted openly on the issue of 
liability in the first place the dispute would have been forestalled. 
In addition, tort creditors of the second category by definition do not contract 
with the company, so there are no "transaction costs" of this nature to reduce. 
(b) shareholder monitoring costs 
With a one-person company, there are no other shareholders to monitor by 
definition. No efficiencies are achieved in this respect when a one-person 
company is at issue. 
(c) enforcement costs 
Limited liability may reduce enforcement costs by limiting recourse to the 
company only. However, where there is only one shareholder, pursuing the 
shareholder is unlikely to be a particularly onerous additional cost. 
Furthermore, where, as is customarily the case with small companies, there is 
no money to meet claims, creditors may well wish to retain the option of 
pursuing shareholders individually in order to retain any hope of achieving any 
compensation at all. 
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( d) other arguments 
Limited liability arguably facilitates the accumulation of capital for the 
purpose of undertaking large projects. However, one could argue in response 
that now that the industrial revolution is passing, the need for this 
accumulation is passing also. There is no widespread demand in New Zealand 
of the 1990s for big ships, big railways or big industrial steel mills on a wide 
scale in order to develop the nation as there was in Britain last century. There 
is not the same social context that led to the political achievement of the 
Limited Liability Act in 1855. In addition, one-person companies are not an 
"accumulation of wealth" by definition. 
In addition, it has been argued that contract creditors bear a loss more 
efficiently than shareholders do because they can insure against the risk of that 
loss and can factor any insurance cost into the cost of their credit. That this 
might not have been the case with Mr Ivory is discussed above. Further, tort 
creditors do not have such opportunity. In the current regime, Mr Ivory has no 
incentive to carry insurance or really to take care. But arguably, with respect to 
tort debts rather than contract debts he is in a better position to bear the loss. 
He is in a better to monitor whether or not he is taking care.
203 Ile is 
subsidised by the insurance of his tort creditors at no cost to him. The current 
regime encourages the undertaking of hazardous activities with insufficient 
precautions and insurance. 
Why is there such a proliferation of small companies in New Zealand? Is it 
because of a New Zealand fondness for the corporate form as part of a general 
fondness for having one's own small business? Is it because small companies 
provide value to the economy? Or is it simply human nature: limited liability 
allows increased return for reduced risk. It allows one's own losses to be 
shifted so that they are borne by other people. It must be remembered that 
203 See Halpern above n 4, 145-149 .. 
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most small businesses fail within their first few years. Limited liability might 
indeed be one last example of a "free lunch". 
If the removal of general limited liability, and the ability to "externalise the 
risk of uncompensated harms", causes some businesses to go out of business 
then they can't have been efficient in the first place. Their costs were not 
worth their benefits. 
Importantly, significant legislative inroads have been made into limited 
liability in the interests of "efficiency". For example, when a company starts to 
approach insolvency a principal is less likely to care about ongoing 
relationships with creditors. The principal is instead more likely to take risks 
to keep the company afloat as by that stage the principal is gambling with the 
creditors' money and favouring his or her own. The legislature has recognised 
that this is inefficient as the creditors' interests are thereby externalised from 
the director's decision-making process. Consequently, section 135 of the 
Companies Act 1993 was passed to impose personal liability on a principal 
that trades recklessly while approaching insolvency. This restores the 
internalisation of the creditors' interests in this situation and thereby restores 
efficiency. 
If this is the situation with respect to voluntary trade or contract creditors, 
arguably some corresponding response is required in the case of the second 
group: that is, tort creditors who by definition do not contract with the 
company and so cannot bargain to have their increased risk of loss taken into 
account. With respect, the precedent value of the decision in Ivory is 
significantly diminished because it does not address these arguments . It seems 
to assume that finding liability on the part of Mr Ivory would undermine the 
principle in Salomon, but Salomon never contemplated the lvaty situation. At 
the very least, that should have dictated a full examination of the merits or 
otherwise of a strict application of Salomon in that case. 
83 
However, even if a law change is indicated with respect to tort victims of the 
second group, it is argued that such a change should not be extended to tort 
victims in third group (that is, tort victims like the Andersons who also 
happened to have a contract with the company). It is argued that people in this 
position do have an opportunity to contract on the relevant risks and have 
those risks taken into account in the relevant bargain. To then be able to bring 
a tort action against the director personally would be " using to1i to supplement 
a contractual bargain". 
However, certainly in the case of the Andersons, this cannot be correct. In fact, 
it does not seem correct to differentiate a third category in such a case at all. 
The Andersons were involuntary creditors in the same way as any other tort 
victim because they were never intending to be "creditors" at all. In fact, the 
original intention was that cash would only flow in one direction: from the 
Andersons to Mr Ivory, for services rendered, and not the other way around. 
Could they have taken the risk of the negligence into account in the 
contractual bargain? Perhaps, but where, as here, they did not do that, surely 
the tort action remains. This must be particularly the case with respect to one-
person companies the mere existence of which is challengeable on economic 
efficiency grounds. Further, the existence of the company arguably 
" befuddled" the contract. It prevented the parties from actually bargaining on 
the relevant issue. Mr Ivory had no incentive to bring up the issue of liability. 
In fact, he had an incentive to keep it quiet, because knowledge of this risk 
might have prevented the Andersons from entering this contract at all (an 
indication of the market at work). 
4. The purposes of company law 
The Companies Act 1955 prohibited one-person companies. However, it was 
easily possible to avoid this rule by a principal simply having one share held 
by a nominee, often the principal's spouse or professional adviser. 
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The Companies Act 1993 recognised that this prohibition on one-person 
companies was being widely flouted. In what might be termed a standard 
"commercial reality" response typical of this area the new Act specifically 
allowed companies to be incorporated with one shareholder only. 
This was a significant change. However, I would argue that it is more a 
reflection on the part of the legislature of the ease with which the corporate 
form can be manipulated to circumvent boundary rules than it is a policy 
decision that incorporation is appropriate for one-person businesses. Indeed, 
the Companies Act 1993, with its "one-size fits all" set of off-the rack rules, 
has been argued to be clearly inappropriate for small, closely-held companies 
such as Mr Ivory 's. Its notification and reporting requirements are clearly 
predicated on the separation of ownership of control that is a feature of large 
probably public-listed companies, (that is, companies that fall within the 
"essential company concept"). Indeed, the increased penalty exposure that 
incorporation now brings has made criminals out of most small companies in 
New Zealand. This is interesting given that most of the companies in New 
Zealand, perhaps even 90%, are small. Could the legislature be trying to 
discourage the use of the corporate form for small businesses such as Mr 
Ivory's? 
What is gained by incorporating a small one-person business nowadays? On 
the one hand a director of such a company faces exposure to criminal penalties 
for failing to comply with onerous requirements which arguably serve no 
value whatsoever where ownership and control are merged. The mechanisms 
in the Act for circumventing these rules204 have serious limitations. Section 
135 and other sections expose the director to unlimited personal liability. In 
addition, banks ' personal guarantees expose directors to further personal 
unlimited liability. Companies of course can grant floating charges, but a 
review of the personal property securities legislation seems likely to extend 
this ability to natural persons. Now that tax rates are flatter, and the company 
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rate matches the top personal rate, there seem few tax incentives for 
incorporating a small business. It is difficult to get money out of companies, 
and dividends contain a degree of double taxation. 
Other than romantic notions of perpetual succession, the only real reason for 
incorporating a business seems to be where there is a concern that the business 
might go under, coupled with an associated desire to have somebody else bear 
the risk of that loss. In other words: to achieve limited liability and thereby 
"escape from personal liability and responsibility"205 (to the extent to which 
limited liability remains). 
Are these valid reasons for retaining the privilege of limited liability, at least 
for small businesses? 
The long title states that the Companies Act 1993 is to reform the law relating 
to companies, and, in particular: 
To reaffirm the value of the company as a means of achieving economic and 
social benefits through the aggregation of capital for productive purposes, 
the spreading of economic risk and the taking of business risks; and ... 
To encourage efficient and responsible management of companies by 
allowing directors a wide discretion in matters of business judgement while 
at the same time providing protection for shareholders and creditors against 
the abuse of management power. (Emphasis added) 
By focusing on the aggregation of capital, the legislature is arguably 
reinforcing the essential company concept. There is no "aggregation of 
capital" by definition where there is only one shareholder. The spreading of 
economic risk arguably relates to contractual trade creditors and not 
involuntary tort creditors. Negligence is not a "business risk" but stems from a 
duty every person has to take care not to injure their neighbour, whether they 
104 Such as the constitution or a s I 07 assent. 
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run an incorporated business or not. The Companies Act reflects a clear 
legislative focus to have people take responsibility for their actions and to cut 
down on abuses of the corporate form. 206 It sits in a legislative context which 
includes the consumer protection focus of the Consumer Guarantees Act of the 
same year, and the Fair Trading Act of 1986. The decision in Trevor Ivory sits 
most uncomfortably in this environment. 
5. Conclusions regarding company law 
How could company law be reformed in order that the correct result might be 
reached should the facts of Ivory come up for determination again? 
(a) remove the ability to incorporate one-person businesses 
It seems there is a significant case for the removal of the ability to incorporate 
one-person businesses.207 Historically and economically there seems little basis 
for granting the privilege of blanket limited liability to such companies, 
particularly one-person advice businesses which by definition are personal in 
nature and generally have little asset-backing. Lawyers and accountants are 
currently unable to incorporate. This prohibition should be retained and 
extended to other advice businesses. 
Such a removal of limited liability would encourage principals of one-person 
advice businesses to consider the full social costs of their decisions;
208 
it would 
force the principals to contract openly on the issue of liability. This scenario 
seems to function perfectly adequately in the case of lawyers and 
201 Fridman above n 7, 53. 
206 Companies Act, s 135, for example. 
201 See also Todd above n 7, 520 for a discussion of the special problems created by one-person advice 
businesses. 
208 I lansmaan above n 12, I 906. 
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t 209 I . l accoun ants. t certain y creates no more problems in that area than the 
ability to incorporate one-person advice businesses has arguably caused for 
people such as the Andersons. 
The inappropriateness of the Companies Act 1993 for one-person companies 
has already led to calls for a separate closely-held company Act, along the 
lines adopted by the United States.210 However, reducing the burden on 
directors in terms of notification and reporting requirements would not address 
the problems caused by cases such as Trevor !vOJy. It also does not answer the 
fact that there does not seem to be a justification for a blanket granting of the 
privilege of limited liability for such companies. It seems that, rather than a 
separate Act, a specific exclusion would be preferable. 
Such an exclusion would clearly have to be instituted by the legislature rather 
than the courts. While acknowledging that there is a legion of corporate veil-
piercing jurisprudence, I respectfully agree with the comment that, in terms of 
the Salomon context, "once an inquiry is admitted into where lies the 
beneficial ownership or control of company shares, the difficulty of inferring 
workable limits to the statutory right of incorporation with limited liability 
b . 11 . bi " 
1 I I ecomes practica y msupera e . -
The difficulty with this approach, however, would be in drawing the 
boundaries. The one-person rule was easily side-stepped in the 1955 Act. An 
"advice" business would be difficult to define and easy to circumvent as well. 
Boundaries are notoriously difficult to maintain in this context. 
(b) limit the ability to incorporate one-person businesses 
209 See Pettet above 11 13 , l 40-14 l . There is always the issue of placing assets in the hands of 
judgement-proof individuals such as trusts, however. See Hansmaan above n 12, l 885-1886 and I 909-
1915 . 
2 10 Robert Dugan Companies Act 1993 - Governance Issues for Closely- Held Companies (Victoria 
University of Wellington Law Review, l 997) . 
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Perhaps a solution could be to make it more difficult for a one-person business 
to achieve the privilege of incorporation. For example, it has been argued that 
businesses should not be allowed to incorporate unless they do so with 
sufficient capital to meet any likely claims. A "minimum capital requirement" 
has generally been rejected as a solution to any problem in this area, however, 
for various reasons. For example, what is "adequate" capital for any given 
business? What capital should Mr Ivory have incorporated his business with in 
order to ensure in advance that there would be sufficient money to meet any 
claims? 
In addition, minimum capital requirements can be easily circumvented ; for 
example, company capital can be eroded by over-leveraging the assets of the 
business (within the requirements of the solvency test perhaps but outside a 
minimum capital requirement). 
Further, a mm1mum capital requirement might be argued to inhibit the 
incorporation of some businesses that would have been of value to society, 
while having little impact on those businesses that would not. 
Generally a minimum capital requirement is not favoured as a solution to the 
problem at hand. However, arguably it would have value as an additional 
protection. In contrast to the ease with which companies can be formed today, 
a minimum capital requirement would at least send a message that care is 
expected in the use of the corporate form . 
In a similar vein, an administrative change could be instituted. Instead of a 
"no-questions-asked" approach when registration of a company is sought, 
potential incorporators could be required to justify why they and their business 
should be granted the privilege of limited liability. Again this might ameliorate 
the problem at issue, but it seems unlikely it would solve it. 
211 Turning Points above n 28, I 0. 
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( c) compulsory insurance 
Compulsory insurance might not be a bad idea. On current legislation, Mr 
Ivory had no incentive to insure fully as his tort creditors were effectively 
subsidising him. Compulsory insurance would provide compensation for tort 
creditors such as the Andersons, and it would also promote more full 
internalisation of costs: too many claims against him would raise the costs of 
that insurance to Mr Ivory. This would at least provide some incentive to take 
care. However, there are many difficulties with a compulsory insurance 
approach, and from a practical perspective, it would be very unlikely that such 
a regime would be implemented. 
In the final analysis, while some reform of company law may ameliorate the 
problem at issue, the corporate form is too fluid to allow any boundaries to be 
effectively created in this area. There are also conflict of laws issues if 
countries have different rules. 212 
It seems that any effective reform in this area must be tlu·ough the law of tort. 
B Reform Tort Law 
A company law analysis effectively considers Mr Ivory as a shareholder, and 
considers to what extent his liability should be limited to the amount unpaid 
on his shares. A tort analysis on the other hand considers Mr Ivory as a 
director, acting in his own right. This seems inherently more correct. 
The reform of the law of tort would be much more simple. The fundamentals 
are already in place. When the issue of the personal duty of care of a director is 
raised, one should simply perform the analysis prescribed by the Court of 
Appeal themselves in South Pacific. The House of Lords' authority of 
Henderson and Williams would also be appropriately considered. 
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A director should be made to bear the consequences of his or her own 
negligence in a case such as Ivory, independently of any considerations of 
limited liability. It is no answer that Mr Ivory is a shareholder as well. Limited 
liability was never intended to provide a shield against the requirement to take 
care. The existence of a company may be a reasonable disclaimer of liability 
on a given set of facts. However, a contra preferentim principle must be 
applied in this context: those seeking to claim the privilege of limited liability, 
particularly with respect to tort creditors, must be required to prove that 
limited liability was actually contracted for. People in the position of the 
Andersons ca1mot be left to bear such losses simply because of a 19
th century 
"sleight of hand". 213 
If this approach effectively removes limited liability for one-person 
companies then that is the market moving to the most efficient outcome. 
Retention of limited liability almost for its own sake is a distortion. 
It might be argued that people would cease to be directors. This argument 
might be met by saying that is simply the market moving to a more efficient 
outcome. The people who would become directors are those who want to 
contribute their entrepreneurial skills and are prepared to take reasonable care 
in the process of doing so. The requirement to take reasonable care is imposed 
on every person in society. Directors should not be excluded. 
VIII CONCLUSION 
The decision in Trevor Ivory seems premised on an unexplained deference to 
the case of Salomon and company law generally. However, the concept of a 
limited liability company is only a metaphor. Salomon can be heavily 
criticised at several levels. It should be seen in its historical , social and 
political context. The law of tort has developed significantly since 1897. 
m Such as the South African-United States asbestos case, Hansmaan above n 12, I 922. 
w That is, Salomon above n 10 
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Salomon is only a case, the same as any other. It should not be afforded 
reverential treatment other than on its intrinsic merits. Those merits should be 
fully examined. One commentator made the following comment in a slightly 
different context: 214 
Unless they are applied in recognition of the changes brought about by 
technological and economic progress, jurisdictional concepts which may have 
been reasonable enough in a simpler economy lose their relation to reality, 
and injustice rather than justice is promoted. 
Arguably, the sentiment applies equally here. The decision in Trevor ivory is 
wrong and the law should be correspondingly reformed. While reform of 
company law may be inadequate in this area, it would be quite appropriate, 
and indeed essential, to reform the law of tort to restore a better balance. 
Arguably, the law of tort already indicates that Trevor Ivory is wrong. 
However, the case of Trevor Ivory is still good law. It should be overruled. 
Limited liability is a privilege, not a right. It should not blind us to the 
purposes of the law, namely: to cause people to live honestly, not to harm 
others and to give each their due. 
214 o Wille "Personal Jurisdiction over Aliens in Patent Infringement Actions: A Uniform Approach 
Toward the Situs of the Tort" ( 199 I) 90 Mich L Rev 658, 658 cited in Miles McCarthy "The 
Territoriality of Intellectual Property Infringement Actions" [ 1997] LLB(Hons) Research Paper, I. 
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